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Article 3

Denying Certiorari in Bell v.
Itawamba County School Board
A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY STUDENTS’
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Elizabeth A. Shaver†
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, the federal appellate courts have
grappled with the issue whether, and to what extent, school
officials constitutionally may discipline students for their offcampus speech. Before 2015, three federal circuit courts had
extended school authority to off-campus electronic speech by
applying a vague test that allows school officials to reach far
beyond the iconic “schoolhouse gate” referenced in the Supreme
Court’s 1969 landmark decision—Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.1 Two other federal
circuits had avoided the issue altogether by deciding the cases
before them on other grounds.2
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals became the
sixth circuit court to wrestle with the issue. In August 2015,
the Fifth Circuit issued an en banc ruling in which multiple
judges urged the Supreme Court to provide guidance regarding
the scope of school discipline over students’ off-campus speech.3
When a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed in the Fifth
† Associate Professor of Legal Writing, The University of Akron School of
Law. As always, many thanks to Phil Carino for his assistance.
1 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see
S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 776–77 (8th Cir.
2012); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574–75 (4th Cir. 2011); Doninger
v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008).
2 Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1070–72 (9th Cir. 2013);
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011).
3 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 433 (5th Cir. 2015) (Prado,
J., dissenting) (“I hope that the Supreme Court soon will give courts the necessary
guidance to resolve these difficult cases.”); id. at 403 (Costa, J., concurring) (“[T]his
court or the higher one will need to provide clear guidance for students, teachers, and
school administrators . . . .”).
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Circuit case,4 it seemed possible that the Supreme Court indeed
would provide the guidance desperately needed by the lower
courts. However, on February 29, 2016, just days after the
unexpected death of Justice Antonin Scalia,5 the Supreme
Court denied the petition that had been filed in the Fifth
Circuit case.6 The eight-member Court thus missed an
opportunity to address this important First Amendment issue.
Determining the proper scope of school authority over
student speech in the digital age involves a complex set of
considerations. When not at school, students have all the
constitutional rights of other citizens, including free speech
rights. In addition, there must be a proper boundary—an
“outer boundar[y]”7—on the ability of school officials to reach
outside of the school community and regulate students’
behavior when they are not at school. Indeed, special care
should be taken to protect students’ rights to engage in free
speech so that the exercise of their free speech rights is not
unduly hampered by the very institution—school—that is
charged with the responsibility of teaching students important
democratic principles.
On the other hand, the capabilities of digital speech are
such that student electronic speech, even if created and
distributed entirely outside of school, can have a profound
impact on the school community. In many instances, school
officials, by acting on information obtained from students’
electronic speech, are able to avoid harm to the school
community—most notably in cases involving threats of violence
such as school shootings.8 Thus, school officials must be given
the appropriate tools to impose discipline when necessary to
preserve and protect the primary goal of schools: to provide a
4 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., No.
15-666, 2015 WL 7299351, at *15 (Nov. 17, 2015).
5 Justice Scalia died unexpectedly on February 13, 2016. See Adam Liptak,
Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
V8GH-AKXY].
6 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016) (mem.). While it is
impossible to know why the Supreme Court denies certiorari in any particular case,
there is evidence that the pace of accepted cases slowed after Justice Scalia’s death. See
Robert Barnes, Scalia’s Death Affecting Next Term, Too? Pace of Accepted Cases at
Supreme Court Slows., WASH. POST (May 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/courts_law/scalias-death-affecting-next-term-too-pace-of-accepted-cases-atsupreme-court-slows/2016/05/01/1d304d1c-0ecb-11e6-bfa1-4efa856caf2a_story.html?
utm_term=.2b46db42e521 [https://perma.cc/N3G4-BC7N]. It may be that the Court is
reluctant to address certain constitutional issues when it is not at full strength.
7 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007); Porter v. Ascension Parish
Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (5th Cir. 2004).
8 Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2013).
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high-quality learning environment in which students can
access and master the academic curriculum.
This article reviews the varied approaches the federal
circuits have taken regarding the scope of school officials’
authority to discipline students for electronic speech that is
created and distributed outside of school. The article then
proposes an analytical framework that, building on Supreme
Court precedent, protects students’ free speech rights while
preserving the ability of school officials to ensure the safety
and wellbeing of the school community.
Part I of this article examines the Supreme Court’s
student speech precedents, none of which involved student offcampus electronic speech. Part II of the article then reviews
the decisions in which the circuit courts have sought to apply
the Supreme Court’s precedents to determine the scope of
school authority over students’ off-campus electronic speech.
Part III examines the views of legal scholars on these
issues and proposes a framework designed to both protect
students’ First Amendment rights and preserve the ability of
school officials to ensure the safety and wellbeing of all
individuals in the school community. As described in more
detail below, the framework proposes that the Court (a)
specifically address the lack of First Amendment protection for
any student speech that threatens violence to members of the
school community; (b) ensure that student electronic speech
that bullies or harasses another student receives no First
Amendment protection; (c) apply Tinker’s substantial
disruption standard to student off-campus electronic speech
that causes an actual disruption at school; and (d) decline to
apply Tinker’s “reasonable forecast of a future substantial
disruption” standard to off-campus student electronic speech.
The overall goal of this framework is to delineate when
students’ electronic off-campus speech extends beyond the
scope of school authority. Imposing a geographic boundary—
i.e., limiting school authority to student speech that occurs only
at school—is unworkable given the reach of digital speech.
Thus, any comprehensive framework on this topic must
specifically address forms and types of students’ electronic
speech in separate categories.
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THE SUPREME COURT’S STUDENT SPEECH CASES

A.

The Supreme Court First Addresses the Scope of
Students’ First Amendment Speech Rights

[Vol. 82:4

The Supreme Court has decided four student speech
cases.9 Although none of the Supreme Court’s student speech
cases involved electronic off-campus speech, the decisions
nonetheless provide an analytical framework that can be
applied to student speech in the digital age.10
Over forty-five years ago, the Supreme Court first
addressed the issue of students’ First Amendment rights while
at school. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, several students sued their local school district
after the school suspended them for wearing black armbands
as a protest against the Vietnam War.11 The Court found that
the disciplinary measures violated the students’ First
Amendment rights.12
In so holding, the Court affirmed that students do not
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”13 Yet the Court also
recognized that First Amendment rights were to be applied “in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment.”14
In the Court’s view, the school setting involves countervailing
considerations that must be balanced. On the one hand, as
institutions that “educat[e] the young for citizenship,”15 schools
should not act in a manner that would “strangle the free
mind”16 or otherwise “teach youth to discount important
principles of our government”17 such as the right to freedom of
9 Morse, 551 U.S. 393; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260
(1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
10 See infra Part III.
11 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. The plan to wear black armbands as a protest of
the Vietnam War arose out of a meeting of adults and students held at the home of one
of the plaintiffs in the case. Id. This plan was communicated to the principals of the
Des Moines school, who adopted a policy prohibiting the wearing of black armbands at
school and authorizing the suspension of any student who refused to remove a black
armband. Id. The plaintiffs in the case were aware of the newly instituted policy before
the day that they wore black armbands to school. Id. In accordance with the school
policy, they were suspended until they returned to school without black armbands. Id.
12 Id. at 505–06, 514. The Court found that the act of wearing black
armbands constituted symbolic speech that was entitled to First Amendment
protection. Id. at 505–06.
13 Id. at 506.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 507 (quoting West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
16 Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
17 Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
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expression. On the other hand, the Court recognized the
“comprehensive authority”18 of school officials to maintain order
at school. According to the Court, school officials must have the
ability to “prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”19
To balance these competing concerns, the Court held
that school officials constitutionally may discipline students for
speech that “materially and substantially disrupt[s] the work
and discipline of the school.”20 The Court also explained that
school officials need not wait for an actual disruption to occur
at school before imposing discipline on a student, so long as
school officials reasonably could forecast a future substantial
disruption.21 The Court cautioned that any such forecast could
not be based on either “undifferentiated fear or apprehension”22
or a “desire to avoid this discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompanies an unpopular viewpoint.”23
On the facts before it, the Court found that school
officials had acted not to avoid a substantial disruption at
school, but simply to avoid discussing the merits of the
Vietnam War. The Court noted that the school policy had
“singled out for prohibition”24 the wearing of black armbands to
protest the Vietnam War, not any other symbols that might be
politically controversial.25 A ban on the expression of one
particular position was not constitutionally permissible in the
absence of any evidence that the ban was necessary to avoid
substantial interference within the school setting.26
Although it articulated a “substantial interference” or
“substantial disruption” standard by which to examine the
constitutionality of school discipline, the decision in Tinker was
not necessarily the model of clarity. First, the Court did not
clearly define what constitutes the “work” or “discipline” of
school. In addition, the Court did not clearly articulate the
facts or factors that cause a disruption of the school
environment to be “substantial” or “material.”27 The Court also
indicated that discipline might be appropriate if a student’s
Id.
Id.
20 Id. at 513.
21 Id. at 514.
22 Id. at 508.
23 Id. at 509.
24 Id. at 510–11.
25 Id. at 510.
26 Id. at 510–11.
27 The Court used different terminology in different sections of the opinion,
referring to both “substantial disorder” and a “material disrupt[ion of] classwork” as
constitutionally permissible grounds for discipline. Id. at 513.
18
19
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speech “intrude[d],”28 “impinge[d],”29 “inva[ded],”30 or “collid[ed]
with”31 the rights of other students, although the Court did not
illustrate when such circumstances might occur.
In reviewing the specific facts, the Court noted that the
students’ act of wearing armbands had not been accompanied
“by any disorder or disturbance on the part of” the plaintiffs.32
The Court also noted that there had been no evidence
presented that any class was disrupted by the wearing of the
armbands.33 The Court further stated: “[o]utside the
classrooms, a few students made hostile remarks to the
children wearing armbands, but there were no threats or acts
of violence on school premises.”34
Justice Hugo Black dissented from the decision in
Tinker.35 He principally took issue with the majority’s
conclusion that the students’ symbolic speech had not
interfered with schoolwork. While acknowledging that the
wearing of black armbands had not prompted “obscene remarks
or boisterous and loud disorder,” Justice Black argued that
school officials were justified in disciplining the students
because their speech had “diverted” other students’ attention
from their classwork.36 He opined that students could be
disciplined for any speech that would cause other students to
take their minds off of their schoolwork.37 In Justice Black’s
view, even a minor or momentary diversion from assigned
classwork could be disciplined.
In addition to being somewhat vague about the contours
of a substantial disruption, the decision in Tinker also failed to
clearly define the proper scope or definition of the “school
environment,”38 a highly relevant question when considering
student speech in the digital age. While the Court did use the
clear image of a physical location—the space located within the
Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
30 Id. at 513.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 508.
33 Id. The majority stated that no class had been disrupted in spite of
evidence apparently in the record that a mathematics class had been “wrecked” by an
in-class dispute with one of the students wearing a black armband. Id. at 517 (Black,
J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 508 (majority opinion).
35 Id. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 518.
37 Id. (“And I repeat that if the time has come when pupils of state-supported
schools, kindergartens, grammar schools, or high schools, can defy and flout orders of
school officials to keep their minds on their own schoolwork, it is the beginning of a
new revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the judiciary.”).
38 Id. at 506 (majority opinion).
28
29
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“schoolhouse gate”39—it also broadened the scope of the ruling
beyond the four corners of a classroom. The Court stated that
its ruling was not limited to “supervised and ordained
discussion which takes places in the classroom,”40 but that
students retained their First Amendment rights, consistent
standards articulated, to express an opinion whether “in the
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the
authorized hours.”41 Yet, in another sentence, the Court stated
that school officials have authority to regulate student speech,
whether it takes place “in class or out of it,” if the speech
creates a substantial interference or disruption.42
Of course, the Court cannot be faulted for not
anticipating the digital age when it decided Tinker. Yet, when
the lower federal courts seek to determine the scope of school
authority over student electronic speech that is created and
distributed outside of school, some courts have resorted to
reading the “tea leaves” of these particular statements in
Tinker in an attempt to define what it means to be at school.43
Although the Court in Tinker used both the words
“interference” and “disruption” to describe the effect of student
speech on the school environment, the standard articulated in
Tinker has become known as the “substantial disruption”
standard. Since Tinker, the Court has never explicitly defined
the phrase “substantial disruption.”44
B.

The Court Determines That Students May Be
Disciplined for Lewd or Obscene Speech That Is Uttered
at School

More than fifteen years after Tinker, the Court again
addressed the issue of students’ First Amendment rights. In
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, a young man filed suit
alleging that school officials had violated his First Amendment
rights by disciplining him for giving a speech at a school
assembly that had been replete with sexual metaphor.45 The
school determined that the student’s conduct violated the
Id.
Id. at 512.
41 Id. at 512–13.
42 Id. at 513.
43 See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 937 (3d
Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring) (describing cases in which the courts were divided
regarding the application of Tinker to off-campus expression).
44 See Lisa Smith-Butler, Walking the Regulatory Tightrope: Balancing
Bullies’ Free Speech Rights Against the Rights of Victims to Be Left Alone When
Regulating Off-Campus K–12 Student Cyberspeech, 37 NOVA L. REV. 243, 303 (2013).
45 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
39
40
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school’s code of conduct, which used the language of Tinker in
prohibiting any conduct that “materially and substantially
interfere[d] with the educational process . . . including the use
of obscene, profane language or gestures.”46 The student
prevailed both at the trial court and appellate level; both courts
found that the school’s code of conduct was unconstitutionally
vague and that the student’s speech had not caused a
substantial disruption at school as required by Tinker.47 The
Supreme Court reversed, finding that discipline was
appropriate because the student had engaged in lewd and
obscene speech at school.48
The Court first distinguished the sexually charged
speech in Fraser from the black armbands of Tinker, stating
that the students in Tinker had not “intrude[d] upon the work
of the school[] or the rights of other students.”49 The Court then
expanded upon Tinker’s concept of the “work” of public schools,
opining a “highly appropriate function of public school
education [is] to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms
in public discourse.”50 Noting that students’ First Amendment
rights are not “coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings,” the Court found that students do not have the same
freedom in terms of their choice of words when expressing their
opinions.51 While an adult in a public place has the right to
choose lewd or obscene language to express a particular
viewpoint, students are not permitted the “same latitude” when
at school.52 Rather, a student’s “freedom to advocate unpopular
and controversial views in schools and classrooms” is tempered by
“society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”53 Thus, the Court
held that the First Amendment allows school officials to discipline
students for lewd or obscene speech that “undermine[s] the
school’s basic educational mission.”54
Id. at 678.
Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1365 (9th Cir. 1985).
48 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 676.
49 Id. at 680.
50 Id. at 683.
51 Id. at 682.
52 Id. Referring to its own 1971 decision in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971), in which the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds the criminal
conviction of an individual who wore a jacket bearing the words, “Fuck the Draft” in
public, the Court noted that “the First Amendment gives a high school student the
classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.” Fraser, 478 U.S. at
682–83 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043,
1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring)).
53 Id. at 682–83.
54 Id. at 685.
46
47
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In concurring with the decision in Fraser, Justice
Brennan made the significant point that the Court’s decision
was limited to lewd speech uttered at school. He stated that
“had [the student] given the same speech outside of the school
environment, he could not have been penalized simply
because government officials considered his language to be
inappropriate.”55 In so stating, Justice Brennan affirmed the
view of many lower courts that students can freely use lewd or
obscene speech when not at school.56
In addition, Justice Brennan repeatedly invoked the
substantial disruption standard of Tinker, characterizing both
the language itself and its effect on the school environment as
“disruptive.”57 Specifically, Justice Brennan stated that the
school officials had sought to “ensure that [the] . . . assembly
proceed[ed] in an orderly manner,”58 and that the discipline had
been imposed because the student’s speech “disrupted the
school’s educational mission.”59 In his concurrence, Justice
Brennan construed the majority holding as an application of
Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.60
Thus, the Court in Fraser was divided on the central
question—whether Tinker’s substantial disruption standard
was the only framework under which regulation of student
speech would be constitutional. This division would again be
evident in the third student speech case decided by the Court.
C.

The Supreme Court Finds That Schools May Exercise
Editorial Control over Student Speech That Appears in
School-Sponsored Publications

Just two years after the Fraser decision, the Court again
issued a significant decision in the arena of students’ First
Amendment rights. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,
the Court held that school officials could “exercise editorial
control”61 over the contents of a school newspaper prepared by
Id. at 688 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
See, e.g., Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441–42 (D. Me. 1986) (holding
that the school could not discipline a student for “giving the finger” to a teacher he
encountered in a restaurant parking lot, stating: “The First Amendment protection of
freedom of expression may not be made a casualty of the effort to force-feed good
manners to the ruffians among us”).
57 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
58 Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 688–89.
60 Indeed, Justice Marshall dissented from the decision in Fraser on the
ground that the school had not shown a “disruption of the educational process.” Id. at
690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988).
55

56
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high school students as part of a journalism course. The
students filed suit after the school principal deleted two stories
from the newspaper.62 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the school newspaper constituted a public forum and
that school officials could not censor the contents of the paper
in the absence of a substantial disruption under Tinker.63 The
Supreme Court reversed. First, the Court found that the school
newspaper was not a public forum, but was a vehicle for
students to learn and apply skills gained in a journalism course
that was part of the school’s curriculum.64 The Court held that
the pedagogical goal of producing the school newspaper
distinguished it from a public forum such that school officials
had not “relinquish[ed] school control over that activity.”65
The Court’s determination that the school newspaper
was not a public forum was significant because, in the Court’s
view, the remaining issue was only whether school officials had
exercised their rights “to regulate the content[] of [the
newspaper] in [a] reasonable manner.”66 The question of the
reasonableness, the Court stated, was the standard by which
the case was to be decided, not the substantial disruption
standard established in Tinker.67 The Court characterized
Tinker as a case involving “[t]he question whether the First
Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student
speech.”68 The Court then contrasted Kuhlmeier as a case
involving “the question whether the First Amendment requires
a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.”69
Finding that Tinker was factually distinguishable, the Court
then explicitly created a separate constitutionally permissible
category of regulation over student speech. It described this
category as control over “school-sponsored publications,
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
62 Id. at 263–64. The two stories involved topics of teen pregnancy and
divorce. Id. at 263.
63 Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1374 (8th Cir. 1986),
rev’d, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
64 Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 269–70.
65 Id. at 270.
66 Id.
67 Id. The Court in Kuhlmeier also characterized Tinker as delineating the
ability of school officials “to silence a student’s personal expression that happens to
occur on school premises.” Id. at 271.
68 Id. at 270.
69 Id. at 270–71. The Court made clear that the Tinker standard did not
apply, stating its conclusion “that the standard articulated in Tinker for determining
when a school may punish student expression need not also be the standard for
determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the
dissemination of student expression.” Id. at 272–73.
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perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”70 In this “second
form of student expression,”71 the Court granted school officials
great discretion, finding that school officials do not violate the
First Amendment “so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”72
As he had done in Fraser, Justice Brennan again wrote
a separate opinion, although in Kuhlmeier he dissented from
the decision.73 Joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
Justice Brennan sharply criticized the majority’s decision to
“abandon[] Tinker”74 in favor of the creation of a second
category of permissible regulation over student speech. He
argued that the majority’s decision to divide student speech
into “incidental” and “school-sponsored” expression had no
basis in precedent.75
In so arguing, Justice Brennan discussed Fraser at
length, asserting that, just two years earlier in Fraser, the
Court had “faithfully applied Tinker.”76 Justice Brennan argued
that Tinker granted school officials sufficient authority to
regulate student expression that would interfere with a school’s
pedagogical or curricular goals.77
In doing so, Justice Brennan employed an expansive
definition of the phrase substantial disruption, stating that
school officials could censor student expression appearing in a
school newspaper if the content contained “poor grammar,
writing or research because to reward such expression would
‘materially disrupt[t]’ the newspaper’s curricular purpose.”78 He
distinguished such constitutionally permissible conduct from
censorship designed to shield either the newspaper’s readers or
the school from the effect of the expression. Justice Brennan
concluded that, on the facts before the Court, it was clear that
Id. at 271, 273.
Id. at 271.
72 Id. at 273.
73 Id. at 277–91 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 687–690 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring).
74 Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 282.
75 Id. at 282–83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 281–82. The majority in Kuhlmeier addressed that contention in a
footnote, disagreeing with Justice Brennan that the decision in Fraser had been
grounded in Tinker’s substantial disruption standard. Id. at 271, n.4 (majority opinion)
(“The decision in Fraser rested on the ‘vulgar,’ ‘lewd,’ and ‘plainly offensive’ character of
a speech delivered at an official school assembly rather than on any propensity of the
speech to ‘materially disrup[t] classwork or involv[e] substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Fraser, 393 U.S. at 513)).
77 Id. at 283–84 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority interpreted Tinker’s
reference to speech that invaded the rights of other students as referring to speech of
one student regarding another student that could give rise to tort liability on the part
of the school. Id. at 273, n.5 (majority opinion).
78 Id. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70
71
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school officials had acted to shield the audience from material
that they deemed to be “too sensitive” or “unsuitable” for an
audience of student-readers. That form of censorship, he
determined, was unconstitutional.
The decision in Kuhlmeier revealed the continued divide
among the justices regarding the appropriate constitutional
framework under which to analyze student speech cases. That
divide would exist for nearly twenty years, until the Court
again decided a student speech case.
D.

The Court Allows School Officials to Discipline Students
for On-Campus Speech That Promotes Illegal Drug Use

Nearly twenty years after the decision in Kuhlmeier, the
Court decided its fourth student speech case. In a 2007
decision, Morse v. Frederick, the Court ruled that school
officials may constitutionally regulate student speech that
reasonably is perceived as promoting illegal drug use.79 In
Morse, school officials had allowed students to leave school
grounds during school hours, although supervised by school
employees, in order to watch the 2002 Olympic Torch Relay
pass by on the street. While standing on the sidewalk, a group
of students unfurled a homemade banner displaying the
message “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”80 When the school principal
saw the banner, she directed the students to take it down, and
all except one student complied.81 The principal confiscated the
banner and suspended the student for displaying a banner with
a pro-drug use message, in violation of a school policy
prohibiting advocacy of illegal drug use.82 He then brought suit,
alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights.83
The lower courts were divided; the federal district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the school on the
ground that the principal had reasonably interpreted the
banner as promoting illegal drug use in contravention of the
school’s drug abuse prevention policy.84 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, finding that school officials had
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
Id. A photograph of the banner being displayed can be found at ‘Bong
Hits 4 Jesus’ Case Heads to High Court, NBCNEWS, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
17648725/ns/us_news-life/t/bong-hits-jesus-case-heads-high-court/#.WOJBw2_yvIU [https://
perma.cc/CG24-J964].
81 Morse, 551 U.S. at 398.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 399.
84 Frederick v. Morse, No. J 02-008 CV, 2003 WL 25274689 (D. Alaska, May
29, 2003), rev’d, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
79
80
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been unable to establish that the student’s speech materially
disrupted the school environment.85
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding
that the discipline had been constitutionally imposed.86 In so
holding, the Court first addressed the student’s argument that
the case was not a “school speech case” because the student
was not on school grounds.87 The Court summarily rejected that
argument, stating that the student could not “stand in the
midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a schoolsanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.”88 Although
the Court found that the particular facts of the case fell
squarely within the student speech cases, the Court did
acknowledge that “[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer
boundaries as to when courts should apply school speech
precedents.”89 Although the Court did not clarify this statement
further, it seems that the Court was acknowledging that school
authority over student speech does extend, to some
unidentified point, beyond the student’s physical presence on
school grounds.
Having disposed with the student’s argument that his
speech was beyond the authority of school officials, the Court
next turned to the issue of whether school officials had acted
within constitutional limits. The Court again affirmed that
students do not lose their First Amendment rights at school,
but noted that the “nature of those rights is what is
appropriate for children in school.”90 Returning to the debate
that had taken place twenty years earlier between the Justices
who decided both Fraser and Kuhlmeier, the Court in Morse
noted that, while the “mode of analysis employed in Fraser
[was] not entirely clear,”91 it could discern two important
principles from the decision. First, due to the “special
characteristics of the school environment,” the First
Amendment rights of students may be regulated in ways that
would not be constitutional if imposed upon either adults or
students in other settings.92 The Court thus affirmed Justice
85

393 (2007).
86
87
88
89

Cir. 2004)).
90

56 (1995)).
91
92

Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 551 U.S.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 410.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 401.
Id. (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (5th
Id. at 406 (quoting Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–
Id. at 404.
Id. at 404–05.
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Brennan’s conclusion that the student in Fraser could not have
been disciplined by school officials had he given the speech
outside of the “school context.”93 Second, notwithstanding
Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Fraser and later dissent in
Kuhlmeier, the Court in Morse found that, in Fraser, the Court
did not “conduct the ‘substantial disruption’ analysis prescribed
by Tinker.”94 Thus, the Court made clear that Fraser had
established a content-based category of unprotected student
speech under which lewd or indecent speech uttered at school
is subject to discipline.
The Court in Morse also reviewed its decision in
Kuhlmeier and reaffirmed that school officials do not violate
the First Amendment by exercising control over student speech
expressed in school-sponsored activities as long as the
regulation is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”95 Further, the Court interpreted the decision in
Kuhlmeier to be consistent with Fraser in two important
respects. First, school officials have the ability to regulate
student speech at school in ways that they “could not censor
similar speech outside the school.”96 Second, the substantial
disruption standard of Tinker “is not the only basis for
restricting student speech.”97
Having concluded that the Court’s precedents allowed
for the creation of certain categories of regulated student
speech, the Court then created an additional content-based
category by allowing restrictions on student speech that could
reasonably be interpreted as promoting illegal drug use.98
Justice Alito concurred in the Court’s decision in Morse,
but added a significant note of caution. Specifically, Justice
Alito wrote separately to reject the argument made by school
officials that they were entitled to restrict any student speech

Id. at 405.
Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 n.4 (1988)
(the majority in Kuhlmeier voiced disagreement with Justice Brennan in terms of the
analysis conducted in Fraser)).
95 Id. at 405.
96 Id. at 406.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 408. Justice Thomas concurred in the result, writing separately to
argue that Tinker is unconstitutional because “the history of public education suggests
that the First Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student speech in
public schools.” Id. at 410–11 (Thomas, J., concurring). This argument is firmly
grounded in the physicality of being at school, where school officials are deemed to be
standing “in loco parentis” when children are at school. Id. at 419. Thus, under Justice
Thomas’s interpretation of the First Amendment, school officials should have no ability
to regulate student speech that occurs outside of school, where the children’s parents
have the ability to control and discipline them.
93

94
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that “interferes with a school’s ‘educational mission.’”99 Justice
Alito wisely recognized the dangerousness of such a position,
since any particular school’s educational mission could be
defined—and re-defined—to fit the political, social, or moral
views of particular administrators.100 He emphasized that the
Court’s ruling in favor of school officials was not premised on
authority to regulate student speech that interfered with an
educational mission but, rather, on the specific and special
characteristics of the school setting. On the facts before the
Court, the “threat to the physical safety of students”101 was an
important characteristic of the school environment that had
been implicated by the arguably pro-drug-use banner.
Employing language that is particularly relevant when one
considers the threats of violence such as school shootings,
Justice Alito stated:
School attendance can expose students to threats to their physical
safety that they would not otherwise face. Outside of school, parents
can attempt to protect their children in many ways and may take
steps to monitor and exercise control over the persons with whom
their children associate. Similarly, students, when not in school, may
be able to avoid threatening individuals and situations. During
school hours, however, parents are not present to provide protection
and guidance, and students’ movements and their ability to choose
the persons with whom they spend time are severely restricted.
Students may be compelled on a daily basis to spend time at close
quarters with other students who may do them harm. Experience
shows that schools can be places of special danger.102

Justice Alito concluded that, in cases involving threats of
violence, school officials “must have greater authority to
intervene” in order to protect students.103 He specifically cited
Tinker’s substantial disruption standard as providing authority
for school officials to intervene “before actual violence erupts.”104
In deciding these four student speech cases over nearly
forty years, the Court failed to articulate a cohesive test
regarding students’ free speech rights. Rather, in each case
decided after Tinker, the Court issued narrow decisions that
were highly specific to the facts before it. As a result, even
99 Id. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Brief of the Petitioners at 21,
Morse, 551 U.S. 393 (No. 06-278), 2007 WL 118979; Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, Morse, 551 U.S. 393 (No. 06-278), 2007 WL
118978).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 424.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 425.
104 Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
508–09 (1969)).
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before the advent of the digital age, school officials had very
little guidance to address student speech issues when the facts
deviated from those of the decided cases. As discussed below,
however, the digital age has brought new complexities to the
issue of students’ free speech rights. The lack of a cohesive and
flexible framework from the Court has caused disarray and
disagreement among the lower federal courts.
II.

THE CIRCUIT COURTS ENTER THE DIGITAL AGE

A.

The Second Circuit Establishes a “Reasonable
Foreseeability” Test

Less than two weeks after the Supreme Court decided
Morse, a case involving student speech appearing on a crudely
made, hand-painted sign, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
decided a case involving student speech using an entirely
different mode of communication—an electronic “instant
message” (IM) distributed via the Internet.105 Thus, only days
after the decision in Morse, the lower federal courts embarked
on the difficult task of applying the Supreme Court’s “twentieth
century” student speech cases to the predominant “twenty-first
century” mode of communication—speech that is created and
distributed electronically.
In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport
Central School District, the parents of an eighth-grade student
sued the school district after their son was disciplined for
transmitting to other students an IM icon with a drawing
depicting the shooting of the student’s English teacher.106 The
student argued that, because he had created and distributed
the IM entirely outside of school via electronic means, his
speech was beyond the authority of school officials.107 The
Second Circuit rejected that argument, holding that school
officials did have the authority over the student’s off-campus
speech because it was a “reasonably foreseeable risk that the
[IM] icon would come to the attention of school authorities” or
“reach”108 the school property. In developing this “reasonable
foreseeability” test, the Second Circuit became the first federal

105 Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch.
Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 39 (The creation of the IM outside of school did not “insulate [the
student] from discipline.”).
108 Id. at 38–39.

2017]

A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

1555

appellate court to address the scope of school authority over
student off-campus electronic speech.
After determining that school officials had authority
over the student’s speech because it was reasonably foreseeable
that the speech would come to the attention of school
authorities, the Second Circuit applied the Tinker test and
determined that school officials had reasonably forecast a
substantial disruption. The court first examined the question
whether the student’s speech constituted a “true threat” under
the Supreme Court’s decision in Watts v. United States.109 In
Watts, the Court held that a federal statute criminalizing
threats against the President of the United States required the
government to establish that the speech constituted a “true
threat.”110 The Second Circuit concluded that it need not
consider whether to apply Watts because, in its view, Tinker’s
substantial disruption standard granted school officials
“significantly broader authority to sanction student speech
than the Watts standard allows.”111 Irrespective of the true
threat analysis, student speech that advocated violence against
a teacher had the potential to materially and substantially
disrupt the school environment.112
However, the three-judge panel in Wisniewski struggled
with the proper test to determine whether Tinker applied to
student speech created and distributed outside of school. The
“panel [was] divided”113 about whether, in the case of offcampus speech, school officials were required to make any
additional showing about the speech’s connection to the school
environment or whether that issue was unnecessary in light of
the fact that the speech had been viewed by school officials.
While noting the panel’s disagreement, the Second Circuit
held, on the specific facts before it, that it was “reasonably
foreseeable that the IM icon would come to the attention of
school authorities,”114 thus providing authority for school
officials to discipline the student under Tinker. The
requirement
of
reasonable
foreseeability—“both
[of]
communication to school authorities . . . and the risk of
substantial disruption”115—was satisfied because of the

109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 37–38 (discussing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)).
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40.
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threatening content of the IM icon and its “extensive
distribution”116 to fifteen other students.
Thus, Wisniewski established a “threshold”117 test that
school officials must satisfy before the Tinker analysis is
undertaken in cases involving students’ off-campus electronic
speech. This threshold test requires school officials to
demonstrate a “reasonable foreseeability” that a student’s offcampus speech would come to the attention of school
authorities or otherwise “reach” campus before discipline could
be imposed.
In March 2008, the Supreme Court denied a petition for
a writ of certiorari that had been filed in Wisniewski.118
In a case decided one year later, the Second Circuit
again applied its “reasonable foreseeability” test to determine
whether school officials could exercise authority over a
student’s electronic off-campus speech. In Doninger v. Niehoff,
a student who was a member of student government was
disciplined after she posted a message on a publicly accessible
blog that contained misleading information and derogatory
language about an upcoming school event, a “battle-of-thebands” concert.119 The student erroneously told the school
community that the concert had been canceled “due to
douchebags in central office”120 and urged students and parents
to flood the school’s administrative offices with complaints via
email or telephone, with the expressed goal of “piss[ing] [school
officials] off more.”121 Due to the student’s efforts, school
administrators did receive a deluge of complaints from
students and parents, which caused school administrators to
spend significant time both in rescheduling the concert and
correcting misinformation distributed by the student.122
Some days after the incident, the student’s blog posting
was brought to the attention of the school superintendent,
whose adult son found the posting on the Internet.123 At the
time, school officials took no action; however, approximately
three weeks later, when the student took steps to accept a
nomination to serve as Senior Class Secretary, the school
Id. at 39.
Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013)
(characterizing the Second Circuit’s decision as establishing a “threshold test”).
118 Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch.
Dist., cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008).
119 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008).
120 Id. at 45.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 45–46.
123 Id. at 46.
116
117
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principal determined that the student should be prohibited
from running for that office as discipline for her speech.124
The student’s mother then sued. The federal district
court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction,
finding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a sufficient
likelihood of success on the merits,125 and the plaintiff appealed
to the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit first noted that the Supreme Court
had not yet addressed the “scope of a school’s authority”126 over
student off-campus speech. Relying on its earlier decision in
Wisniewski, the court then articulated two, slightly different
“foreseeability tests” to determine the scope of school authority
over off-campus speech. First, the court stated that a student
may be disciplined for off-campus speech that “‘would
foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the
school environment’ at least when it was similarly foreseeable
that the off-campus expression might also reach campus.”127
Later in the opinion, the court stated that school discipline is
permissible when “it [is] reasonably foreseeable that the
[speech will] come to the attention of school authorities and
that it would create a risk of substantial disruption.”128
The court did not explain whether the two
articulations—authority over off-campus speech that either
“reach[es] campus”129 or “come[s] to the attention of school
authorities”130—are in fact the same measure or test.131
Compounding the confusion, the Second Circuit applied both
articulations to the facts of the case. The court first stated that
“it was reasonably foreseeable that [the blog] posting would
reach school property.”132 Later in the same paragraph, the
court stated that “it was reasonably foreseeable that . . . school
administrators would be aware of [the blog posting].”133 Based
on these two, slightly different articulations, the Second Circuit

Id.
Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d
41 (2d Cir. 2008).
126 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 50.
129 Id. at 48.
130 Id. at 50.
131 By using both articulations, the decision in Doninger essentially continued
the debate begun among the judges in the Wisniewski case about whether the speech
actually had to reach school property or whether it was sufficient that it was reasonably
foreseeable that speech would reach school property. See supra notes 113–116.
132 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50.
133 Id.
124
125
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concluded that school officials had authority over the student’s
off-campus speech.
The Second Circuit then concluded that school officials
had correctly applied Tinker.134 The court did not find that an
actual substantial disruption had occurred at school, only that
the student’s speech had created a foreseeable risk of a future
disruption. The court cited three reasons for this finding.135
First, the court found that the student’s use of “plainly
offensive” language—such as calling school officials
“douchebags”—inflamed the controversy rather than resolved
it.136 Second, the student’s misleading characterization of the
controversy led to a “deluge of calls or emails” that caused
school officials to “miss or be late to school-related activities”
and could have caused further disruption had it continued.137
Third, the court found that the student’s position as a student
government leader warranted discipline because her behavior
was potentially disruptive of student government functions.138
After the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
denial of plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the
case continued to be litigated in the federal courts. In January
2009, the federal district court granted the defendants’ motions
for summary judgment as to the student’s First Amendment
claim premised on her blog posting.139 The Second Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part the grant of summary
judgment.140 The Supreme Court then denied the student’s
petition for a writ of certiorari.141
B.

The Third Circuit Avoids the Scope of Authority Issue,
but Members of the Court Have Strong Differences of
Opinion

Shortly after the Second Circuit issued its decision in
Doninger, the Third Circuit began to wrestle with the scope of

Id. at 50.
Id. at 50–52.
136 Id. at 50–51.
137 Id. at 51.
138 Id. at 52.
139 Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D. Conn. 2009), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011) (defendants’ motion for summary judgment
granted in part and denied in part; the court denied summary judgment only as to a
First Amendment claim stemming from the school district’s determination that other
students could not wear “Team Avery” T-shirts in support of the plaintiff).
140 Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
141 Doninger v. Niehoff, 565 U.S. 976 (2011) (mem).
134
135
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school authority over student off-campus electronic speech.142 In
2011, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, decided two student
off-campus speech cases that had remarkably similar facts.
However, the Third Circuit’s twin decisions did not clarify the
constitutional limits of school officials’ authority to discipline
students for off-campus electronic speech. To the contrary, the
decisions revealed a deep divide among the judges on the issue.
In the first case, Layshock v. Hermitage School District,
a high school senior, Justin Layshock, used his grandmother’s
home computer to create a “parody profile” of the school
principal that Layshock then posted on MySpace.com.143 The
parody profile contained numerous outlandish statements
purportedly written by the principal.144 In creating the profile,
Layshock copied a photograph of the principal from the
district’s website, which he then used in the parody profile.145
In addition, there was some evidence that Layshock had
accessed the profile on a school computer and showed it to a
few students during school hours.146
A few days after he posted this profile, the principal
learned of its existence from his daughter, who had heard
about the profile at school.147 Finding the profile to be
“degrading’ and ‘shocking,”148 the principal asked the school to
commence an investigation, which ultimately identified
Layshock as the creator of a profile of the principal.149 The
district disciplined Layshock for violating the school code of
conduct, including prohibitions on the use of obscene
142 Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 212 (3d
Cir. 2011) (en banc); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925
(3d Cir. 2011).
143 Layshock, 650 F.3d at 208–09.
144 Id. at 208. The parody profile included the following statements, among others:

In the past month have you been on pills: big pills
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big dick
In the past month have you Stolen Anything: big keg
Ever been drunk: big number of times
Ever been called a Tease: big whore
Ever been Beaten up: big fag
Ever Shoplifted: big bag of kmart
Number of Drugs I have taken: big.
Id.

Id. at 207–08.
Id. at 209. After Layshock first posted his profile, other students created
and posted at least three additional profiles of the principal, all of which were more
vulgar than Layshock’s parody profile. Id. at 208.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 209.
149 Id. at 208–09.
145

146
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language.150 Layshock was given a ten-day suspension, sent to
an alternative education program for the remainder of his
senior year, banned from all extracurricular activities, and
prohibited from attending his graduation ceremony.151
Layshock and his parents sued.152 The federal district
court granted summary judgment in Layschock’s favor on a
First Amendment claim.153 A three-judge panel of the Third
Circuit then affirmed.154 The court found discipline was not
warranted under Fraser because no lewd or obscene language
had been used at school.155 The court also reiterated the lower
court’s ruling that the school had not presented evidence of any
substantial disruption sufficient to allow discipline under
Tinker, a finding that the school district had not challenged on
appeal.156 However, the panel opinion was vacated pending a
rehearing of the case by the Third Circuit sitting en banc.157
In June 2011, the Third Circuit issued its en banc
decision in which it unanimously affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Layshock.158 The Third
Circuit framed the issue presented in the case as follows:
We are asked to determine if a school district can punish a student for
expressive conduct that originated outside of the schoolhouse, did not
disturb the school environment and was not related to any school
sponsored event. We hold that, under these circumstances, the First
Amendment prohibits the school from reaching beyond the schoolyard to
impose what might otherwise be appropriate discipline.159

At the outset, the Third Circuit noted that, on appeal,
the school district had abandoned any argument that its
discipline of Layshock was constitutional under Tinker.160
Rather than relying on Tinker, the school district argued that

Id. at 209–10.
Id. at 210.
152 Id.
153 Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587,
606 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
154 Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010).
155 Id. at 260–63.
156 Id. at 260–61. The Third Circuit noted that the school district had not
disputed on appeal the district court’s finding that it had failed to provide sufficient
evidence of a substantial disruption as would be necessary to constitutionally discipline
a student under Tinker. Id. at 261.
157 Layshock, 593 F.3d 249.
158 Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).
159 Id. at 207.
160 Id. at 214. In granting summary judgment in favor of Layshock, the
district court stated that the school district could not establish a “nexus” between the
parody profile and any substantial disruption at school. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
150
151
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its discipline of Layshock was constitutional under Fraser.161
The school district acknowledged that Fraser was limited to the
use of lewd and obscene language at school; however, the
district argued that Layshock’s act of entering the district’s
website to cut and paste the principal’s picture constituted an
entry into school property sufficient to treat the profile as oncampus speech.162 The school district also argued that it was
“reasonably foreseeable” that the profile would come to the
attention of school authorities, thus employing the language of
Doninger.163 In making this argument, the school district
sought to broaden the scope of school authority to include
discipline under Fraser for any off-campus lewd or offensive
speech so long as it reasonably could be foreseen that the lewd
speech would come to the attention of school authorities.
The Third Circuit rejected this argument.164 It
distinguished Doninger specifically on the ground that the
Second Circuit had applied the foreseeability test to determine
scope of authority to discipline a student for substantially
disruptive speech under Tinker.165 In addition, the Third
Circuit was quite clear that it had discussed Doninger only
because the district raised the argument and, importantly, that
it did not necessarily endorse the Second Circuit’s position,
stating, “[I]n citing Doninger, we do not suggest that we agree
with that court’s conclusion that the student’s out of school
expressive conduct was not protected by the First Amendment
there.”166 Ultimately the Third Circuit concluded that Fraser
clearly applied only to the lewd or obscene speech uttered at
school and that school officials had no authority to impose
discipline for a student’s lewd speech created and posted
electronically outside of school.167
While the en banc decision in Layshock was unanimous,
the judges of the Third Circuit clearly did not agree on the
scope of authority question. That disagreement was apparent
in the second student speech opinion that the court issued
simultaneously with the Layshock decision.168 In the second case,
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, the court

161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216–17.
Id. at 214, 216.
Id.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 217–18.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 219.
See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011).

1562

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:4

ruled eight to six in favor of the student, although five of the eight
majority judges joined in a separate concurring opinion.169
In Snyder, as in Layshock, the student—identified as
J.S.—had created an obscenity-laced fake profile of the school
principal that J.S. then posted on MySpace.170 J.S. created the
profile outside of school and, although it was briefly publicly
available, J.S. changed the accessibility of the profile to
“private,” thus limiting access to about twenty-two other
students who were “friends” on MySpace.171 The principal
learned of the profile from another student and, due to the
private setting in MySpace, was able to review its contents only
after asking that student to print out a copy of the profile and
bring it to school.172 After reviewing the profile, the principal
and other school officials disciplined J.S.173
She and her parents then sued, claiming a violation of
her First Amendment rights.174 Unlike the Layshock case, the
federal district court determined that the school’s discipline of
J.S. had been constitutional under Fraser because the speech
was lewd and vulgar and, although created off-campus, had an
on-campus effect.175 A three-judge panel of the Third Circuit
first affirmed the district court’s ruling, then vacated the
decision pending a rehearing en banc.176 After additional
briefing and oral argument, a narrow majority of the Third
Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling on the First
Amendment issue and remanded the case to the lower court for
further proceedings.177
The majority in Snyder avoided the central issue of
whether school officials have authority to discipline students
for off-campus speech, stating that it would “assume, without
deciding, that Tinker applies to” off-campus speech.178 In other
See id. at 936–41 (Smith, J., concurring).
Id. at 920–21 (majority opinion). The profile was written as if it described
the life of a “bi-sexual Alabama middle school principal named ‘M-Hoe.’” Id. at 920. The
profile listed the fictitious principal’s interests as: “detention, being a tight ass, riding
the fraintrain, spending time with my child (who looks like a gorilla), baseball, my
golden pen, fucking in my office, hitting on students and their parents.” Id.
171 Id. at 921.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 922.
174 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL
4279517, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008).
175 Id. at *6–7. The federal district court distinguished the district court’s
decision in Layshock, which had found no constitutional basis for discipline, on the
ground that the profile created by J.S. was “much more vulgar and offensive.” Id. at *8.
176 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 286 (3d Cir. 2010).
177 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920. The court did affirm the district court’s judgments
that the district’s policies were not void for vagueness and that the defendants did not
violate any Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. Id.
178 Id. at 926.
169

170

2017]

A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

1563

words, the court treated the student’s speech as on-campus
speech contemplated in Tinker. The majority did note the
student’s argument that school officials’ ability to discipline
students was limited to the schoolhouse and acknowledged that
the argument had “some appeal,” but deemed it unnecessary to
reach the issue in order to decide in the student’s favor.179
Rather, the majority found that, even assuming that Tinker
applied, the district had not presented any evidence of a
substantial disruption that would warrant the discipline imposed
on J.S.180 The majority also determined that the lower court had
erred in applying Fraser to the student’s speech, stating that
“Fraser’s ‘lewdness’ standard [could not] be extended to justify a
school’s punishment of J.S. for use of profane language outside
the school, during non-school hours.”181
Judge D. Brooks Smith wrote a concurring opinion,
joined by four other judges, in which he directly addressed the
scope of authority question avoided by the majority.182 Judge
Smith opined that school officials should have very limited
authority over students’ off-campus speech, stating that “the
First Amendment protects students engaging in off-campus
speech to the same extent it protects speech by citizens in the
community at large.”183 Using the Supreme Court’s own
language, Judge Smith concluded that “Tinker’s holding is
expressly grounded in ‘the special characteristics of the school
environment’”184 and grants limited authority to “prescribe and
control conduct in the schools.”185 He predicted dire
consequences if the authority granted to school officials under
Tinker was extended too far, stating:
Applying Tinker to off-campus speech would create a precedent with
ominous implications. Doing so would empower schools to regulate
students’ expressive activity no matter where it takes place, when it
occurs, or what subject matter it involves—so long as it causes a
substantial disruption at school. . . . Suppose a high school student,
while at home after school hours, were to write a blog entry
defending gay marriage. Suppose further that several of the
Id. at 926 n.3.
Id. at 928.
181 Id. at 932.
182 Id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring).
183 Id.
184 Id. at 937 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969)).
185 Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507). Judge Smith argued that, in Morse,
Justice Alito himself had recognized that Tinker did not extend to off-campus speech,
noting Justice Alito’s statement that “Tinker allows schools to regulate ‘in-school
student speech . . . in a way that would not be constitutional in other settings.’” Id. at
938 (omission in original) (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito,
J., concurring)).
179
180
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student’s classmates got wind of the entry, took issue with it, and
caused a significant disturbance at school. While the school could
clearly punish the students who acted disruptively, if Tinker were
held to apply to off-campus speech, the school could also punish the
student whose blog entry brought about the disruption. That cannot
be, nor is it, the law.186

As Judge Smith framed the issue, the difficult question was not
whether Tinker could extend to “off-campus” speech but how to
define whether a students’ electronic speech has taken place
either “on” or “off” campus.187 Using the example of a student
who might email a teacher from home, Judge Smith opined
that speech by a student that is “intentionally directed towards
a school” would be considered “on-campus” speech and thus
subject to the authority of school officials.188
Yet Judge Smith soundly rejected the Second Circuit’s
foreseeability test, stating that “[a] bare foreseeability standard
could be stretched too far, and would risk ensnaring any offcampus expression that happened to discuss school-related
matters.”189 He rejected the notion that truly off-campus speech
somehow “mutate[s] into on-campus speech” by reaching the
campus.190 As to the fake profile created by J.S., Judge Smith
determined that the profile did not constitute on-campus
speech that was subject to discipline under Tinker.191
As stated above, the Third Circuit was highly divided in
the Snyder case. Six of the fourteen judges dissented from the
decision to affirm the lower court’s ruling on the First
Amendment issue.192 The dissenting judges applied Tinker to
the student’s speech, arguing that school officials could have
reasonably forecasted a future disruption due to the student’s
speech.193 In particular, the dissenting judges forcefully argued
that “personal and harmful attacks on educators and school
officials” are always disruptive to the school community.194 A
great deal of the dissenting opinion was devoted specifically to
outlining reasons why students ought to be subject to discipline
186
187

campus?”).

Id. at 939.
Id. at 940 (“[H]ow can one tell whether speech takes place on or off

Id.
Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 940. Among the facts demonstrating that the speech was entirely off
campus were: it had been created outside of school, had not been sent by the student to
any school employee, had been accessible only to a limited number of individuals due to
the private setting in MySpace, and that school computers blocked access to MySpace. Id.
192 Id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 945.
194 Id. at 946.
188
189
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for “off-campus hostile and offensive student internet speech
that is directed at school officials.”195 And the dissenters also
opined that school authority should extend to speech created by
students outside of school due to the “near-constant student
access to social networking sites on and off campus.”196
Indeed, in the view of some Third Circuit judges, the
two decisions in Layshock and Snyder were “competing
opinions”197 that created uncertainty on the scope of authority
issue.198 Judge Kent A. Jordan wrote a concurring opinion in
Layshock specifically to assert his strong view that, under
Tinker, school officials could exercise authority over a student’s
off-campus speech.199 Judge Jordan used somewhat strong
language to criticize two of the opinions in Snyder. He
criticized the majority in Snyder for failing to address the scope
of authority question and simply “assuming” that Tinker
applied.200 Judge Smith’s position was criticized on the ground
that the “‘off-campus versus on-campus’ distinction is artificial
and untenable in the world we live in today.”201
Judge Jordan found that the “omnipresence”202 of speech
communicated via “wireless internet access, smart phones,
tablet computers, social networking services like Facebook, and
stream-of-consciousness
communications
via
Twitter”203
renders any rule based on “physical boundaries of a school
campus”204 unworkable. Judge Jordan advocated that school
officials be given broad authority to “forecast how poisonous
accusations lobbed over the internet are likely to play out
within the school community” and to impose discipline
whenever school officials might reasonable forecast a
disruption.205 Although he did make note of the Supreme
Court’s reference to an “uncertainty at the outer boundaries” of
what constitutes speech subject to school authority, Judge
Jordan made no effort to define that outer boundary or
Id. at 950.
Id. at 951–52.
197 Layshock ex rel. Layschock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 220 (3d
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Jordan, J., concurring).
198 For a detailed discussion of the disagreement among the Third Circuit
judges, including a tabular description of the judges’ positions in Snyder, see Watt
Lesley Black, Jr., Omnipresent Student Speech and the Schoolhouse Gate: Interpreting
Tinker in the Digital Age, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 531, 541 tbl.1 (2015).
199 Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219–22 (Jordan, J., concurring).
200 Id. at 220.
201 Id. (citing Snyder, 650 F.3d at 915, 947–48, n.4 (Fisher, J., dissenting)).
202 Id. at 221.
203 Id. at 220.
204 Id. at 221.
205 Id. at 222.
195
196
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otherwise articulate a limitation on the scope of the authority
of school officials.206
The Third Circuit’s twin decisions in Layshock and
Snyder only created further division and confusion among the
federal appellate courts regarding the appropriate framework
under which to analyze First Amendment claims involving
students’ off-campus speech.207 And, as it had with earlier
cases, the Supreme Court denied petitions for writs of
certiorari that had been filed in both Snyder and Layshock,
thus again foregoing the opportunity to address a student
electronic speech case.208
C.

The Fourth and Eighth Circuits Adopt the Second
Circuit’s “Reasonable Foreseeability” Test

In a decision issued just one month after the Third
Circuit’s fractured rulings in Layshock and Snyder, the Fourth
Circuit continued to complicate the scope of authority over
student electronic speech in a case that involved
cyberbullying.209 A high school student, Kara Kowalski, had
created a discussion group webpage entitled “S.A.S.H.,” which
other students recognized as an acronym for the phrase
“Students Against Shay’s Herpes,” where “Shay” referred to
another student at school.210 Kowalski then invited about one
hundred of her social media “friends” to join the group.211
Approximately two-dozen high school students did join the
group and many of them posted derogatory comments and
photographs of Shay, the target of the webpage.212 School
officials were unaware of the page until it was brought to their
attention by Shay’s parents.213
After conducting an investigation, school officials
determined that the student had violated the school’s written
bullying and harassment policy and punished her by, among
other things, issuing a ninety-day social suspension and

Id. at 220 n.2 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007)).
Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2013)
(discussing various approaches of federal appellate courts).
208 Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d 915, cert. denied,
565 U.S. 1156 (2012); Layshock, 650 F.3d 205, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012).
209 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
210 Id. at 567.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 567–68. One student posted photographs of Shay. Id. at 568. On one
photograph, he drew red dots on the girl’s face to simulate herpes. Id. In another
photograph of Shay, he added a caption that read, “portrait of a whore.” Id.
213 Id.
206

207
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prohibiting her from participating on the cheerleading squad
for the remainder of the school year.214
The student then sued both the school district and
several school officials, asserting both First Amendment and
Due Process claims.215 After the federal district court dismissed
all claims,216 the student appealed, claiming that “school
administrators had no power to discipline her” because her
speech had been created and distributed off campus.217 Citing
the Second Circuit’s decision in Doninger, school officials
argued that school officials had authority over the student’s
speech because it was foreseeable that the speech would “reach the
school.”218 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling,
finding that school officials did have authority over the student’s
speech and that the discipline had comported with Tinker.219
However, the rationale behind the Fourth Circuit’s
determination on the scope of authority issue was somewhat
unclear. In addressing the scope of authority question, the
Fourth Circuit stated:
There is surely a limit to the scope of a high school’s interest in the
order, safety, and well-being of its students when the speech at issue
originates outside the schoolhouse gate. But we need not fully define
that limit here, as we are satisfied that the nexus of Kowalski’s speech
to Musselman High School’s pedagogical interests was sufficiently
strong to justify the action taken by school officials in carrying out
their role as the trustees of the student body’s well-being.220

The Fourth Circuit’s use of the word “nexus” has led
some courts and commentators to conclude that, on the scope of
authority issue, the Fourth Circuit had created a different test
than the foreseeability test articulated in Doninger.221 This socalled “nexus” test apparently examines the strength of the

Id. at 568–69.
Id. at 567.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 570–71.
218 Id. at 571.
219 Id. at 577.
220 Id. at 573.
221 Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 782 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2013);
Margaret A. Hazel, Student Cyber-Speech After Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools,
63 S.C. L. REV. 1081, 1087 (2012) (describing Kowalski as adopting a “sufficient nexus
approach”); Daniel Marcus-Toll, Tinker Gone Viral: Diverging Threshold Tests for
Analyzing School Regulation of Off-Campus Digital Student Speech, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3395 (2014); Mary Noe, Sticks and Stones Will Break My Bones but Whether
Words Harm Will Be Decided by a Judge, N.Y. ST. BAR J., Jan. 2016, at 39. But see
Black, supra note 198, at 551 (“The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits all considered
the question of the reasonable foreseeability that a student’s off-campus speech would
reach the school before extending Tinker to off-campus speech.”).
214
215
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connection between the speech and school.222 And yet, nowhere
in the opinion did the Fourth Circuit say either that it
disagreed with the Doninger test or that it was crafting a
different test on the scope of authority issue. Also absent was
any discussion of the facts or factors by which a sufficient
nexus could be established in student speech cases generally or
in the specific case itself. Thus, if the Fourth Circuit had
intended to adopt a “nexus” test for off-campus speech that
differed from Doninger, it failed to define that test.223
In fact, rather than rejecting the reasoning of Doninger,
the Fourth Circuit discussed Doninger at length and actually
applied the foreseeability test.224 The opinion included a
lengthy paragraph in which the court described Doninger and
quoted the Second Circuit’s conclusion that discipline is
appropriate when “it [i]s . . . foreseeable that the off-campus
expression might . . . reach campus.”225 The Fourth Circuit then
applied the reasonable foreseeability test to the facts before it,
finding that “it was foreseeable in this case that Kowalski’s
conduct would reach the school via computers, smartphones,
and other electronic devices.”226 Thus, it is fair to conclude that
the Fourth Circuit applied the Doninger foreseeability test
rather than creating a new and different “nexus” test.
As it had with Wisniewski, Doninger, Layshock, and
Snyder, the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of
certiorari that had been filed in Kowalski.227
In a case decided just one month after Kowalski, the
Eighth Circuit also relied upon the Second Circuit’s
foreseeability test in holding that school officials had authority
over a student’s off-campus expression that threatened a school
shooting. In D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District No.
60,228 the Eighth Circuit relied on the Second Circuit’s decision
in Wisniewski to find that authority over a student’s off-campus
speech exists when it is “reasonably foreseeable” that the
student’s speech would “come to the attention of school
authorities.”229 In a decision issued one year after the D.J.M.
decision, the Eighth Circuit relied on both Doninger and
Kowalski as support for its application of a foreseeability test,
222

(Pa. 2002).
223
224
225
226
227
228
229

J.S. ex rel. H.S. & I.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865
Marcus-Toll, supra note 221, at 3431.
Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574.
Id. (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008))
Id.
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 565 U.S. 1173 (2012) (mem.).
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 765–66 (internal citations omitted).
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finding that school officials had authority to discipline students
for racist speech posted on the Internet because the speech
“could reasonably be expected to reach the school or impact the
school environment.”230
D.

The Ninth Circuit Declines to Adopt Any of the
Previously Articulated Tests

In 2013, the Ninth Circuit became the fifth federal
circuit to address the scope of authority issue in the context of
students’ off-campus electronic speech. In Wynar v. Douglas
County School District,231 the Ninth Circuit held that school
officials had authority to discipline a student who, from his
home, had sent “a string of increasingly violent and
threatening instant messages . . . bragging about his weapons,
threatening to shoot specific classmates, intimating that he
would ‘take out’ other people at a school shooting on a specific
date, and invoking the image of the Virginia Tech massacre.”232
In addressing the scope of authority issue, the Ninth
Circuit reviewed all of the earlier decisions of its “sister
circuits,”233 including the decisions in Kowalski, Lee’s Summit,
Wiesniewski, Snyder, and a 2004 decision of the Fifth Circuit
involving student off-campus speech that was not
communicated electronically.234 The Ninth Circuit noted that,
in Doninger, Kowalski, and Lee’s Summit, the courts had
devised “additional threshold test[s]”235 as prerequisites to the
application of Tinker’s substantial disruption standard. In the
Ninth Circuit’s view, each case had created different threshold
tests.236 The Ninth Circuit interpreted Kowalski as establishing
a “nexus” test237 and Lee’s Summit as establishing a test
requiring it be “reasonably foreseeable that [the speech]
[would] reach the school community.”238 Citing Wiesniewski (not
Doninger), the Ninth Circuit asserted that the Second Circuit’s
S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012).
Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013).
232 Id. at 1064–65.
233 Id. at 1067–69.
234 In Porter, the Fifth Circuit held that school officials had no authority to
discipline a student who had drawn a picture depicting violence at school, which came
to the attention of school officials two years after its creation, when the student’s
younger brother discovered the picture at home and took it to school. Porter v.
Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 620 (5th Cir. 2004).
235 Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1068.
236 Id. at 1068–69.
237 Id. at 1068.
238 Id. at 1068 (quoting S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist.,
696 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2012)).
230
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threshold test was not clear, but that it permitted school
discipline where “it is reasonably foreseeable that off-campus
speech meeting the Tinker test will wind up at school.”239
Finally, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Third and Fifth
Circuits had “left open the question whether Tinker applies to
off-campus speech.”240
In the end, the Ninth Circuit declined to adopt any of
the positions of its sister circuits. The court noted the difficulty
of articulating “a global standard for a myriad of circumstances
involving off-campus speech.”241 It also expressed “reluctan[ce]
to . . . craft a one-size fits all approach.”242 Rather, the court
relied on the content of the student’s speech, stating that
“when faced with an identifiable threat of school violence,
schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus
speech” that would cause a substantial disruption.243 The court
then affirmed the trial court’s determination that school
officials had not violated the student’s First Amendment rights,
noting that “it is an understatement that the specter of a school
shooting” could cause a substantial disruption at school.244
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit also analyzed the
student’s speech under the “rights of others” prong that the
Supreme Court had articulated in Tinker.245 The Ninth Circuit
did note that this standard is little used by the federal circuit
courts, but also held that it was quite an apt standard to apply
to speech that threatened a school shooting.246 The court stated:
“Whatever the scope of the ‘rights of other students to be secure
and to be let alone,’ without doubt the threat of a school
shooting impinges on those rights.”247

239 Id. at 1068–69. It seems incorrect for the Ninth Circuit to have relied on
the opinion in Wisniewski when the later opinion in Doninger expands on the Second
Circuit’s view of the scope of authority issue. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d
Cir. 2008). However, it may be that the Ninth Circuit chose to use Wisniewski because
that case, like the one before the Ninth Circuit, involved a threat of violence.
240 Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 1070. The Ninth Circuit also invoked Tinker’s language referring to
the “rights of other students to be secure and let alone.” Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
245 Id. 1071–72.
246 Id. at 1072.
247 Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
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The Fifth Circuit Creates a New Test on the Scope of
Authority Issue

In 2015, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals became the
sixth circuit court to grapple with the scope of authority issue
in the context of student off-campus electronic speech. The
court’s en banc decision in Bell v. Itawamba County School
Board, in which sixteen members of the Fifth Circuit authored
eight different opinions, epitomizes the deep divisions among
the circuit courts on this issue.248
The student’s speech in Bell was a rap song recorded
outside of school and posted on the Facebook page of Taylor
Bell, a student at Itawamba Agricultural High School, who
recorded the song under the name “T-Bizzle.”249 The rap song,
which was riddled with vulgar and obscene language, accused
two of the high school’s athletic coaches of sexually harassing
female students.250 The two coaches were easily identified from
the lyrics of the rap song.251 In addition to accusing the two
coaches of sexual harassment, some lyrics referred to acts of
violence against the coaches, as follows:
●

“Run up on T-Bizzle/I’m gonna hit you with my rueger”;

●

“You fucking with the wrong one/going to get a pistol down your
mouth”; and

●

“Middle fingers up if you want to cap that nigga/middle fingers
up/he get no mercy, nigga.”252

The day after Bell posted the rap recording to his
Facebook page, one of the coaches learned about the song from
his wife, listened to the song while at school, and immediately
informed the school’s principal.253 The school district’s
superintendent also was informed.254 The next school day, the
principal and superintendent, along with the school district’s
outside counsel, questioned Bell about the recording, but took
no action.255

Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
Id. at 383–84.
250 Id. at 383.
251 Id. at 384.
252 Id. The court noted that the word “rueger” referred to a firearm
manufactured by Sturm, Ruger & Co., id. at 385, and that the word “‘cap’ . . . is slang
for ‘shoot.’” Id.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
248

249
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Due to inclement weather, school was closed for four
consecutive school days.256 During that time, Bell created a new
version of the recording and uploaded it to YouTube.257 When
Bell returned to school following the four-day break, the school
informed him at midday that he was suspended pending a
disciplinary hearing; however, he was permitted to remain at
school for the remainder of the school day so that he could take
the school bus home.258
Approximately two weeks later, a disciplinary hearing
was held.259 Bell appeared before the disciplinary committee
and stated that he had created the rap song to bring awareness
to the issue of alleged harassment by the coaches and that he
had not intended to make any threats of violence against the
school coaches, although he acknowledged that the words of the
rap song could be construed as a threat.260 Following the
hearing, the disciplinary committee determined that it could
not conclusively find that the Bell’s song constituted a threat to
teachers,261 but that his speech had constituted “harassment
[or] intimidation of []teachers, in violation of school policy.”262
The disciplinary committee recommended that the school board
impose several sanctions, including placement in the county’s
alternative school for the remainder of the grading period.263
Bell appealed the committee’s decision to the school
board, which reviewed the matter and determined that “Bell
not only harassed [or] intimated [school employees], but [that
he] also [made threats against] them.”264 The school board thus
accepted the disciplinary committee’s recommendation.265
Immediately thereafter, Bell and his mother filed suit.266
Initially the Bells sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
implementation of the school board’s disciplinary sanctions;267
however, the federal district court denied the motion as moot
because Bell’s placement at the alternative school had ended.268
Id.
Id. The recording was publicly accessible on YouTube. Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 386.
261 Id. The school board’s attorney sent a letter to Bell’s mother informing her
that the disciplinary committee had found “the issue of whether or not lyrics published
by Taylor Bell constituted threats to school district teachers was vague.” Id.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 386–87.
265 Id. at 387.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 388.
256
257
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Later, the federal district granted the school board’s motion for
summary judgment, finding that Bell’s rap song had “in fact
caused a material and/or substantial disruption at school” and
also that school officials had reasonably forecast that a
substantial disruption could take place at school.269
The Bells then appealed to the Fifth Circuit.270 In
December 2014, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court, finding that the school board had
violated Bell’s First Amendment rights by disciplining him for
his off-campus speech.271 The decision was a two-to-one ruling,
with Judge Rhesa Barksdale writing a vigorous dissent.272 In
February 2015, the Fifth Circuit granted the school board’s
petition for a rehearing en banc and vacated the earlier opinion
pending additional briefing and oral argument before the en
banc panel.273 Oral argument was heard before the en banc
panel on May 12, 2015.274
The en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion
in August 2015.275 The court affirmed the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of the school board, finding that
the board had not violated Bell’s First Amendment rights.276
However, the en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit was highly
divided. Of the twelve judges in the majority, six judges either
authored or joined in separately written concurring opinions.277
Four judges dissented from the decision, and each of the
dissenting judges wrote a separate dissenting opinion.278
The majority opinion279 began by reviewing the Supreme
Court’s four student speech cases, ultimately concluding that
the constitutionality of discipline imposed on Bell properly
should be analyzed under Tinker rather than any of the other
school speech cases.280
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840–42 (N.D. Miss. 2012).
Bell, 799 F.3d at 388. Although Bell and his mother had asserted claims in
addition to a violation of First Amendment rights, the Bells appealed only the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the school board as to Bell’s First
Amendment claim. Id.
271 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2015).
272 Id. at 305 (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
273 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 782 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d en banc,
799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
274 See Docket Sheet, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd. 782 F.3d 712 (5th Cir.
2015) (No. 12-60264) (noting that oral argument was held on May 12, 2015).
275 Bell, 799 F.3d at 380.
276 Id. at 383.
277 Id. at 380.
278 Id.
279 The majority opinion was written by Judge Barksdale, who had dissented
from the decision in the original panel opinion in the case. Id. at 383; Bell, 774 F.3d at
304 (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
280 Bell, 799 F.3d at 389–91.
269

270
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On the scope of authority issue, the majority opinion in
Bell asserted that five of the six circuit courts to address the
issue had determined that “under certain circumstances,
Tinker applies to speech which originated, and was
disseminated, off-campus.”281 In tallying up the circuit courts
that had extended Tinker to off-campus speech, the majority in
Bell included the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wynar—
notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s express reluctance to
adopt any of the threshold tests of the other circuits and the
Ninth Circuit’s refusal to fashion its own test under which
students’ off-campus electronic speech generally would be
subject to school authority.282 The majority also included its
own circuit as one that favored extending Tinker to off-campus
speech even though the Fifth Circuit had not yet addressed the
issue.283 Additionally, two of the three prior Fifth Circuit cases
on the issue had found in favor of the students on the ground
that school authority did not extend to speech created off
campus.284 The only pro-school Fifth Circuit decision cited by
the majority was decided in 1973, years before the Supreme
Court decided Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse and, of course,
before the widespread use of electronic communications.285
Although counting all but the Third Circuit as having
concluded that Tinker can apply to off-campus speech,286 the
majority opinion did note that the circuit courts had taken
“varied approaches”287 to the issue. The majority expressly
declined either to “adopt or reject approaches advocated by
other circuits”288 or to “adopt any rigid standard”289 with regard
Id. at 393–94.
Id. at 394. For the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to adopt tests fashioned by other
courts or to draft its own, generally applicable test, see Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch.
Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2013).
283 Bell, 799 F.3d at 393–94.
284 Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 620 (5th Cir. 2004);
Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972). In Shanley, the Fifth
Circuit held that school officials did not have authority to discipline students for the
distribution of a newspaper created outside of school and distributed “near but outside
the school premises.” Id. at 964. The Fifth Circuit did apply Tinker in determining that
the distribution of the newspaper had not caused a substantial disruption at school;
however, the court also emphasized the out-of-school nature of the students’ conduct.
Id. at 964, 970.
285 See Bell, 799 F.3d at 394 (citing Sullivan v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 475
F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the First Amendment did not protect the
conduct of students who stood just outside an entrance to school campus selling an
underground newspaper to other students who were entering campus)); see also Morse
v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260
(1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
286 Bell, 799 F.3d at 393–94.
287 Id. at 395.
288 Id. at 396.
289 Id.
281
282
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to the scope of authority issue; rather, it fashioned a test
entirely limited to the facts before it. The majority held that
Tinker applies to a student’s off-campus speech when (a) “a
student intentionally directs [speech] at the school community,”
and (b) the speech is “reasonably understood by school officials
to threaten, harass, and intimidate a teacher.”290
Those two circumstances only addressed the preliminary
question whether school officials had the authority to examine the
student’s speech under the Tinker substantial disruption
standard.291 Thus, in order to answer the penultimate question
whether the conduct of officials had violated Bell’s First
Amendment rights, the majority considered whether his speech
either had caused a substantial disruption or could have been
reasonably forecast to cause a substantial disruption.292 On that
question, the majority concluded that school officials could have
reasonably foreseen that Bell’s rap song would cause a future
substantial disruption had he not been disciplined.293
As noted above, there were multiple concurring and
dissenting opinions written in Bell. Several judges who
concurred in the decision wrote concurring opinions in an
apparent effort to limit the scope of the majority decision.294 For
example, Judge E. Grady Jolly wrote a separate concurring
opinion in which he stated that he would have decided the case
“in the simplest way . . . by saying as little as possible.”295 Judge
Jolly would have adopted a more limited rule focused solely on
threats of violence, as follows:
Student speech is unprotected by the First Amendment and is
subject to school discipline when that speech contains an actual
threat to kill or physically harm personnel and/or students of the
school; which actual threat is connected to the school environment;
and which actual threat is communicated to the school, or its
students, or its personnel.296

Thus, Judge Jolly would not have addressed off-campus
student speech that could be construed as harassing or
intimidating a teacher.

290 Id. In a decision issued in 2016, the Fifth Circuit, quoting Bell, stated that
the decision whether to apply Tinker in any particular case is “heavily influenced by
the facts in each matter.” Brindson v. McAllen Ind. Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 519, 533 n.7
(5th Cir. 2016).
291 Bell, 799 F.3d at 396.
292 Id. at 397.
293 Id. at 398–400.
294 Id. at 400 (Jolly, J., concurring); id. at 401 (Walker Elrod, J., concurring).
295 Id. at 401 (Jolly, J., concurring).
296 Id.
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Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod wrote a concurring opinion
that also focused only on threats of physical violence.297 She
opined that the majority opinion did not make Tinker
applicable to off-campus student speech of a nonthreatening
nature “even though some school administrators might
consider such speech offensive, harassing or disruptive.”298
Casting the majority opinion in Bell as one that avoided such
ominous implications by “sensibly” limiting the scope of school
authority to student speech that “contained threats of physical
violence,” Judge Walker concurred in the result.299
Finally, Judge Gregg Costa wrote a concurring opinion,
joined by two other members of the panel,300 in which he
emphasized the need for guidance from the Supreme Court on
the scope of authority issue, stating:
Broader questions raised by off-campus speech will be left for
another day. That day is coming soon, however, and this court or the
higher one will need to provide clear guidance for students, teachers,
and school administrators that balances students’ First Amendment
rights that Tinker rightly recognized with the vital need to foster a
school environment conducive to learning. That task will not be easy
in light of the pervasive use of social media among students and the
disruptive effect on learning that such speech can have when it is
directed at fellow students and educators.301

Four judges of the en banc panel dissented from the
decision in Bell, and each judge wrote a separate dissenting
opinion.302 Judge James L. Dennis, who had written the
majority opinion in the original panel decision that had been
vacated pending en banc review,303 wrote a scathing dissent in
which he accused the majority of committing “several serious and
unfortunate constitutional errors.”304 In sharp words, he accused
the majority of gutting students’ First Amendment rights:
[T]he majority opinion obliterates the historically significant
distinction between the household and the schoolyard by permitting
a school policy to supplant parental authority over the propriety of a
child’s expressive activities on the Internet outside of school,

Id. at 401 (Walker Elrod, J., concurring).
Id. at 402.
299 Id.
300 Id. (Costa, J., concurring).
301 Id. at 403.
302 Id. (Dennis, J, dissenting); id. at 433 (Prado, J., dissenting); id. at 435
(Haynes, J., dissenting); id. (Graves, J., dissenting).
303 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2015).
304 Bell, 799 F.3d at 406.
297

298
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expanding schools’ censorial authority from the campus and the
teacher’s classroom to the home and the child’s bedroom.305

In sharp contrast to the approach taken by the majority, Judge
Dennis’s analysis of the issue began not with the question
whether Bell’s speech was “student” speech or not, but whether
his speech was entitled to First Amendment protection
generally.306 In other words, Judge Dennis first treated Bell as
a citizen, not a student.307 Characterizing Bell’s rap song as
speech on an issue of public concern, specifically alleging sexual
harassment of female students, Judge Dennis opined that Bell’s
speech was speech that “occupie[d] the highest rung of hierarchy
of First Amendment values and [thus] . . . entitled to special
protection.”308 Citing Supreme Court precedent,309 Judge Dennis
opined that the vulgar and violent words used in the song did not
alter the conclusion that the song addressed a matter of public
concern, even if Bell’s words “f[e]ll short of the School Board’s
aesthetic preferences for socio-political commentary.”310
Judge Dennis next criticized the majority’s two-part test
for determining whether Bell’s rap song was student speech
subject to the disciplinary power of school authorities. As to the
first part of the test, the requirement that a student must have
“intentionally directed”311 speech at the school community,
Judge Dennis noted that such a requirement would eviscerate
the First Amendment by punishing the speaker for attempting
to communicate his message to others.312 In other words, a
student could avoid satisfying this requirement of “intentional

Id. at 404.
Id. at 406–12.
307 Indeed, Judge Dennis criticized the majority for “simply assuming that all
children speak ‘qua students,’” id. at 415 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 389–90
(majority opinion)), and for otherwise assuming that “minors’ constitutional rights
outside of school are somehow qualified if they coincidentally are enrolled in a public
school” id.
308 Id. at 406 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011)).
309 Judge Dennis reviewed at length the Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder v.
Phelps, in which the Court found that the First Amendment prohibited the imposition
of tort liability against the Westboro Baptist Church, a fringe group that had picketed
the funerals of American soldiers killed in the line of duty. Id. at 407–09; see Snyder v.
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011). At such funerals, picketers had displayed signs that
read, among other things, “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Thank God for IEDs,” and
“God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11.” Snyder, 562 U.S. at 448. The Court held that
such speech was protected under the First Amendment because the picketers had been
commenting on matters of public concern. Id. at 450–51, 460–61. Such speech is
protected by the First Amendment even if it is “upsetting,” “arouses contempt,” or
expresses an idea that society finds to be “offensive or disagreeable.” Id. at 458.
310 Bell, 799 F.3d at 409 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
311 Id. at 412.
312 Id. at 411.
305
306
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direction” only if the student communicated so privately that his
message would not be seen by many in the school community.
As to the second part of the majority’s test—that the
speech would be reasonably understood to constitute
threatening, harassing, or intimidating language toward a
teacher—Judge Dennis decried the use of “content-based” and
“vague” language as a means to determine First Amendment
protection.313 He concluded that the “majority opinion’s failure
to . . . defin[e] ‘threatening,’ ‘harassing,’ or ‘intimidating’”
language made its articulated test constitutionally
unworkable.314 Judge Dennis also opined that this vague
language would impermissibly define First Amendment
protection according to the potential reactions of listeners.315 He
categorically rejected any test of free speech that would rely on
the listener’s idiosyncratic interpretation of the speech as
harassing or intimidating.316 Judge Dennis expressed concern
that the constitutional infirmities of such vague language were
further “exacerbated by the facts that the Tinker [substantial
disruption] standard itself could be viewed as somewhat
vague.”317 In Judge Dennis’s view, these “various layers of
vagueness” would impermissibly restrict students’ First
Amendment protections.318
Judge Dennis made no attempt to fashion an alternative
test to govern the scope of authority over students’ off-campus
speech. Rather, he simply criticized the majority’s decision to
apply Tinker to the off-campus speech at issue in the case,
finding that the Tinker standard applied only to “speech that
actually occurs within the school environment.”319 He also
criticized the extension of school authority to student offcampus speech as an unwarranted intrusion into parents’
rights to control the upbringing of their children.320 Finally,
Judge Dennis concluded that, even if school officials had the
authority to discipline Bell for his off-campus speech, they had
violated his First Amendment rights because the facts did not

Id. at 413–16.
Id. at 416.
315 Id. at 419–22.
316 Id. at 421.
317 Id. at 418.
318 Id. at 419.
319 Id. at 425.
320 Id. at 426 (“[I]t is a dangerous fiction to pretend that parents simply
delegate their authority—including their authority to determine what their children
may say and hear—to public school authorities . . . .” (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551
U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring))).
313
314
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demonstrate either an actual substantial disruption at school
or a reasonable forecast of a substantial disruption.321
Judge Edward C. Prado also wrote a dissenting opinion
in Bell.322 Judge Prado briefly reviewed some of the other circuit
court decisions addressing student off-campus electronic speech
before concluding that the majority opinion had “appear[ed] to
depart from the other, already divided circuits in yet another
direction.”323 He then expressed “hope that the Supreme Court
will soon give courts the necessary guidance to resolve these
difficult cases.”324 Noting that Bell’s speech did not fit into
“currently established, narrow categories of unprotected speech”325
previously articulated by the Supreme Court, Judge Prado
opined that the court should have “wait[ed] for the Supreme
Court to act before exempting a new category of speech from
First Amendment protection.”326
Finally, Judge James E. Graves authored a dissenting
opinion in which he proposed that a “modified Tinker
standard”327 be used in cases involving student off-campus
speech.328 Judge Graves’s test cobbled together various pieces of
the decisions of other circuits, principally the Doninger and
Kowalski cases.329 The test proposed by Judge Graves would
allow school officials to discipline a student for off-campus speech
if the school could (a) satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption
standard (either an actual or reasonably forecasted disruption)
and (b) “demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the speech and
the school’s pedagogical interests that would justify the school’s
discipline of the student.”330 Three nonexclusive factors could
demonstrate a sufficient nexus. Those factors were (a)
“whether the speech could reasonably be expected to reach the
Id. at 427–31.
Id. at 433–35 (Prado, J., dissenting).
323 Id. at 433–34.
324 Id. at 433.
325 Id. at 434. He also stated that the issue of students’ off-campus electronic
speech was a “poor fit” within current First Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 433.
326 Id. at 434. Judge Prado did note that the Fifth Circuit previously had held
that student speech threatening violence on the scale of “mass, systematic schoolshootings in the style that has become painfully familiar in the United States” is not
protected by the First Amendment. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Ponce v. Socorro
Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 770–71 (5th Cir. 2007)).
327 Id. at 435.
328 In addition to the dissenting opinions of Judges Dennis, Prado, and
Graves, Judge Catharina Haynes wrote a brief dissenting opinion in which she stated
that she would have reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and
remanded the case for reasons stated in the majority opinion of the three-judge panel
that had originally decided the case. Id. (Haynes, J., dissenting) (citing Bell v.
Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 290–303 (5th Cir. 2015)).
329 Id. at 436 & nn.2–6.
330 Id. at 436.
321
322
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school environment”;331 (b) “whether the school’s interest as
trustee of student well-being”332 outweighs parents’ traditional
role in disciplining their children for conduct outside of school;333
and (c) “whether the predominant message of the student’s
speech is entitled to heightened protection.”334
Thus, the en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit struggled
mightily to reach a decision in the Bell case. In addition to the
test articulated in the majority opinion, both concurring and
dissenting judges sought to fashion other rules.335 Among both
the concurring and the dissenting judges were requests that
the Supreme Court provided necessary guidance on the “the
difficult issues of off-campus online speech.”336
On November 17, 2015, Bell filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court.337 On February 29, 2016,
the Supreme Court denied the petition.338 Thus, the lower
federal courts were left without the Supreme Court’s “clear
guidance”339 on the constitutionality of school discipline
resulting from students’ off-campus electronic speech.
III.

EXISTING PRECEDENTS PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK TO
ADDRESS STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE
DIGITAL AGE

The splintered and disparate approaches taken by the
federal circuit courts have resulted in scores of different
opinions among scholars and educators about the proper
framework to be applied to student off-campus electronic
speech. Most commentators agree that students have the free
speech rights of an ordinary citizen when not at school.340 Also
331 Id. at 436 & n.3 (citing Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch.
Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008);
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011)).
332 Bell, 799 F.3d at 436 & n.4.
333 As to this second factor, Judge Graves proposed that a court should give
“particular weight to evidence, experiential or otherwise,” that would demonstrate that
a type or category of student off-campus speech had “a unique and proven adverse
impact on students and the campus environment.” Id. (emphases omitted). He
specifically referenced the research on bullying that had been cited by the Fourth
Circuit in Kowalski as an example of such evidence. Id. at 436 & n.6.
334 Id.
335 Id. at 403 (Jolly, J., concurring); id. at 435 (Graves, J., dissenting).
336 Id. at 435 (Prado, J., dissenting).
337 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bell, 799 F.3d 379 (No. 15-666), 2015
WL 7299351.
338 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
339 Bell, 799 F.3d at 403 (Jolly, J., concurring).
340 See Richard Salgado, Protecting Student Speech Rights While Increasing
School Safety: School Jurisdiction and the Search for Warning Signs in a PostColumbine/Red Lake Environment, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1371, 1373 (2005) (noting that
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a point of general agreement is that students have the right to
a safe and secure learning environment uninterrupted by the
speech of other students.341 How to accomplish those twin goals,
however, is a subject of much debate.
Although the scope of students’ First Amendment rights
regarding off-campus electronic speech is a thorny one, the
Supreme Court’s existing precedents, when considered
together, largely provide the appropriate framework to balance
students’ constitutional rights against the authority of school
officials to maintain an orderly and effective learning
environment at school. In particular—with the one exception of
speech that threatens violence—the Tinker standard largely
provides the appropriate framework to address students’ free
speech rights in the digital age.342 The following discussion thus
demonstrates how Tinker can be applied to different categories
or types of student electronic speech.
A.

The Court Should Create a New Category of Unprotected
Student Speech: Speech That Threatens Death or
Serious Bodily Harm to a Member of the School
Community

Clearly the on-campus/off-campus distinction should not
protect student speech that threatens serious physical harm to
any member of the school community, whether the threat is
akin to a Columbine-type shooting343 or a specific threat made
against a particular individual.344 Students and school
employees alike should be protected from threats of death or
serious bodily harm. Thus, the First Amendment should not
considerations of safety and security are important but “school administrators do not
necessarily trample upon students’ First Amendment rights”); Black, supra note 198,
at 557 (noting that school administrators need guidance to balance students’ First
Amendment rights against the need for safety); Jon G. Crawford, When Student OffCampus Cyberspeech Permeates the Schoolhouse Gate: Are There Limits to Tinker’s
Reach?, 45 URB. LAW. 235, 249 (2013) (discussing the need to balance rights to feel safe
and secure against the right of free speech).
341 See supra note 340.
342 There are scholars who have advocated that Tinker be abandoned
completely. See, e.g., R. George Wright, Post-Tinker, 10 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV.
LIBERTIES 1 (2014). Others have advocated that a different standard be created
specifically for students’ “technology-facilitated expression.” Kathleen Conn, The Third
Circuit En Banc Decisions on Out-of-School Student Speech: Analysis and
Recommendations, 270 EDUC. L. REP. 389, 406 (2011).
343 Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013).
344 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d
Cir. 2007); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 851–52 (Pa.
2002) (The student’s off-campus speech included a drawing of a teacher “with her head
cut off and blood dripping from her neck,” accompanied by a list of reasons why she
should die.).
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protect any student’s off-campus electronic speech that a school
official reasonably believes is a credible threat of death or
serious bodily harm against either the school community in
general or any member of the school community.
To date, the courts essentially have recognized and
upheld this principle, although the legal analyses they have
employed to reach this conclusion have varied.345 For example,
in Wisniewski, the Second Circuit applied a threshold test
premised on some “reasonable foreseeability” that speech
would reach school in a case in which a student’s off-campus
speech threatened a teacher.346 In Wynar, the Ninth Circuit did
not employ a threshold test, but determined that a student’s
off-campus threats of a school shooting were not protected
under Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.347 In Bell, the
Fifth Circuit determined that Tinker would apply to student
off-campus speech of a threatening nature if the student
“intentionally directed” the speech at the school community.348
Thus, while these cases may have reached the correct
conclusion,349 the courts’ varying approaches do not provide
clear guidance for school officials to guide their decision
making when considering whether to discipline students for
off-campus speech.
The most suitable approach is to simply create an
additional category of unprotected student speech. Since the
Court decided Tinker in 1969, it has not hesitated to create
additional categories of unprotected student speech. In at least
two cases, the Court approved content-based restrictions on
student speech. In Fraser, the Court ruled that lewd, indecent,
and offensive speech was not protected when uttered at
school.350 In Morse, the Court ruled that student speech that
promotes illegal drug use was not protected.351 Importantly, in
deciding Morse, the Court took pains to clarify that, in Fraser,
it had not applied Tinker but had created a separate category
of unprotected student speech.352 Thus, the Court in Morse
345 See Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About
School Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591,
599–603, 620–23 (2011) (discussing the courts’ varied rationales for imposing discipline
on student speech that threatens school employees, whether the speech originated on
campus or off campus).
346 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39.
347 Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069–70.
348 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 396 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
349 It is not clear that, on the question of the violent nature of the student’s
speech, the correct decision was reached in Bell. See supra notes 308–310.
350 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
351 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408–10 (2007).
352 See supra Section I.D.
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approved of content-based restrictions on student speech if
necessary to maintain order at school.
While these two content-based categories were limited
to the school environment, the rationale for creating these
categories was broadly grounded in the “special danger[s]”353
that can exist at school and the “special characteristics of the
school environment.”354 Obviously a credible threat of death or
serious bodily harm to members of the school community is one
of those special dangers.355 Students at school are a “captive
audience”356 since their attendance at school is mandatory.357 As
our nation’s recent experiences make plain, students
sometimes are captive victims of the deadly intentions of
others.358 In light of that grim reality, school officials must be
able to act whenever faced with a credible threat of serious
bodily harm to any member of the school community.
Thus, the Court should create a new category of
unprotected student speech. Student violent speech should not
simply be folded into Tinker’s substantial disruption standard,
as was done in Wynar.359 There are two advantages of delinking the threats of violence from the substantial disruption
standard. One is that it simply avoids the somewhat tortured
linguistics of labeling a school shooting as “disrupti[ve].” School
shootings are horrific events, not merely “disruptive.”360 Second,
removing credible threats of violence from the definition of a
“substantial disruption” also will allow the Court to separately
describe the scope of a substantial disruption, thus giving
valuable guidance to school officials as to that separate
category of regulation over student speech.
Thus, the Court should find that student speech that
school officials reasonably believe is a credible threat of death
Morse, 551 U.S. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
355 See, e.g., Gold Waldman, supra note 345, at 603 (detailing the psychological
effects experienced by school employees who were the targets of students’ violent speech).
356 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).
357 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (“School
attendance can expose students to threats to their physical safety that they would not
otherwise face.”).
358 142 School Shootings Since Sandy Hook Massacre in Newtown, Conn.,
WASH. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/1/142-schoolshootings-sandy-hook-massacre-newtown-c/ [https://perma.cc/TKW7-RQ6V] Other information
about school-associated violent deaths can be found at School-Associated Violent Death
Study, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/violence
prevention/youthviolence/schoolviolence/savd.html [https://perma.cc/5DK7-TDVV] (last
updated May 11, 2016).
359 Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013).
360 Id. at 1070 (“It is an understatement that the specter of a school shooting
qualifies . . . under Tinker.”).
353

354
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or serious bodily harm to any member of the school community
is not protected under the First Amendment.361 Such student
speech is subject to discipline regardless of where it was
created, the means by which it was communicated to school
officials, or the location where the threat may be carried out.
While school officials should (and likely would) involve law
enforcement when a student’s electronic speech indicates that
violence may occur outside of school, school discipline still is
the appropriate response—over and above any law enforcement
proceedings—when a student threatens violence against any
member of the school community.
If the Court were to create such a category of
unprotected student speech, the Court should also clarify the
contours of such a rule. In particular, the Court should find
that the inquiry is not whether the student subjectively
intended to threaten someone, but whether a reasonable school
official could objectively interpret the language as a threat.362
On that issue, the Court must distinguish the student
speech context from its recent decision in Elonis v. United
States363 and the federal cases that have reached differing
conclusions regarding the intent requirement in the context of
a “true threat” analysis.364 In Elonis, the Court addressed the
issue whether criminal penalties could be imposed on an
individual who published threatening statements on the
Internet without proof that the defendant subjectively intended

361 This is a different rule than that proposed by Judge Jolly in his concurring
opinion in Bell. See supra Section II.E. Judge Jolly proposed a three-element rule that
required (a) “an actual threat to kill or physically harm” school staff or students; (b)
which is “connected to the school environment”; and (c) “is communicated to the
school,” including students or school staff. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d
379, 401 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Judge Jolly’s rule contains limits that are not ideal.
So, for example, if a student’s threatening speech was communicated to someone who
was not another student or school personnel, the third element would not be satisfied.
362 See J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 857–58
(Pa. 2002). In J.S., the student’s off-campus speech included a picture of the teacher
with her head cut off and blood dripping from her neck. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the student’s speech constituted a “true threat” that was not entitled to
First Amendment protection. Id. In so holding, the court applied “an objective
reasonable person standard.” Id. (citing In the Interest of A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712 (Wis.
2001)). However, some scholars take the position that school officials must determine
the student’s subjective intent as part of a true threat analysis. See, e.g., Mary
Margaret Roark, Elonis v. United States: The Doctrine of True Threats: Protecting Our
Ever-Shrinking First Amendment Rights in the New Era of Communication, 15 U. PITT.
J. TECH. L. & POL’Y. 197, 217 (2015).
363 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
364 See John Villasenor, Technology and the Role of Intent in Constitutionally
Protected Expression, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 652–56 (2016) (discussing the
“subjective-versus-objective question” that has divided the federal courts in analyzing
true threats).

2017]

A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

1585

to make a threat.365 The defendant in Elonis, an adult male,
had written several posts on Facebook expressing a desire to
harm others, including one post in which he stated, “I’m
checking out and making a name for myself/Enough
elementary schools in a ten mile radius to initiate the most
heinous school shooting ever imagined.”366 After being convicted
of violating federal law that criminalized communication
transmitted in interstate commerce that contained “any threat
to injure the person of another,”367 the defendant appealed his
conviction on the ground that the government was required to
prove that he subjectively intended his postings to be threats.368
The Court reversed the defendant’s conviction, finding
that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury that it
need consider only whether a reasonable person would regard
the defendant’s postings as threats.369 The Court determined
that the reasonable person standard should not be applied to a
criminal statute, reasoning that the imposition of criminal
sanctions requires some proof that the defendant was aware of
his wrongdoing.370
By deciding the case on the more narrow issue of
whether the particular criminal statute required proof of a
subjective intent to threaten, the Court avoided the
constitutional question of the intent requirement needed to
establish that speech constituted a true threat.371 Justice
Thomas authored a dissenting opinion in which he did consider
the First Amendment question.372 To demonstrate the need for
an objective reasonable person standard, Justice Thomas
invoked the circumstance of a school shooting, stating:
[T]here is nothing absurd about punishing an individual who, with
knowledge of the words he uses and their ordinary meaning in
context, makes a threat. For instance, a high-school student who
sends a letter to his principal stating that he will massacre his
classmates with a machine gun, even if he intended the letter as a
joke, cannot fairly be described as engaging in innocent conduct.373

Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004.
Id. at 2006.
367 See id. at 2007; United States v. Elonis, 897 F. Supp. 2d 335 (E.D. Pa.
2012) (noting defendant’s conviction and denying post-trial motions); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c) (2012).
368 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
369 Id. at 2012.
370 Id.
371 See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 420–21 (5th Cir. 2015)
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (discussing Elonis).
372 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
373 Id.
365
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Indeed, threats to cause harm in the school environment do
require a different analysis. Even if the Court correctly applied
the subjective intent standard in Elonis, a case involving a
criminal statute, the school setting is entirely different. Given
the special characteristics of the school environment and the
potentially devastating results of violence in the school setting,
school administrators should be able to act on a lesser
standard, namely whether a school administrator reasonably
believes that the student’s electronic transmission contains a
credible threat of violence. The ability to impose discipline
without a constitutional challenge would be severely curtailed
if students who made such threats had a ready defense,
specifically that they intended only to make a joke.374 Simply
put, application of a subjective standard might make school
administrators more reluctant to act. On the other hand, if the
school imposes discipline based on an objective standard, then
the student could not later succeed on a First Amendment
claim by saying, “I was just kidding.” In light of the potential
risks, the objective standard, namely whether an objective
school administrator would have reasonably determined that
the electronic transmission contained a threat of violence,
should be applied.
In addition, unlike Elonis, any discipline meted out by
school officials does not criminalize behavior or impose criminal
penalties. Thus, the use of a reasonable person standard in
terms of school discipline results in far fewer consequences
than it does in the criminal context.
School officials have the enormous responsibility to
ensure that all students at school are safe and “secure.”375 In
order to fulfill their responsibilities to all students who are
compelled to attend school, the proper standard in the school
context is whether school officials reasonably interpret the
speech as a credible threat of death or serious bodily harm.
The Court also could provide guidance as to what
constitutes a credible threat to cause death or serious bodily
harm. The student’s speech at issue in Wynar provides a good
example of a credible threat. There, the student frequently
posted messages on social media that, over a period of months,
grew ever more violent.376 He specifically threatened to conduct
a school shooting on April 20, the anniversary of the Columbine
See Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)
(Students have a right “to be secure and to be let alone.”).
376 Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1065.
374
375
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shooting.377 He described the type of gun and ammunition that he
would use, noting that he would “probly only kill the people I
hate?/who hate me/then a few random to get the record?”378 The
student’s speech alarmed the other students with whom he had
shared his posts to such an extent that they contacted a school
employee.379 After viewing the student’s online postings, the police
were called and the student was taken into custody.380
In contrast, a recent federal district court case provides
an example of speech that would not be viewed as a credible
threat. In Burge v. Colton School District, a middle school
student, who was disciplined for off-campus statements he had
posted on social media, filed suit alleging a violation of his First
Amendment rights.381 The student’s speech included statements
that he wanted to “start a petition to get [his teacher] fired,”382
that she was “the worst teacher ever,”383 and that she was “just a
bitch.”384 After a friend responded “XD HAHAHAHA!!,”385 the
student wrote “Ya haha she just needs to be shot.”386
Although the student deleted the post within twentyfour hours after posting it, another student had printed out a
copy of the post and, many weeks later, gave the printout to the
school principal.387 The principal then determined to suspend
the student from school and thereafter the student filed suit.388
The federal district court granted the student’s motion for
summary judgment, finding that the school district had
violated the student’s First Amendment rights.389
The court determined that the student’s speech could
not be construed as a true threat to school safety under either a
subjective or an objective standard.390 In so holding, the court
noted that, after reading the printout, school officials did not
question the student or his parents about access to guns, seek
Id.
Id.
379 Id. at 1066.
380 Id.
381 Burge ex rel. Burge v. Colton Sch. Dist., 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057 (D. Or. 2015).
382 Id. at 1060.
383 Id.
384 Id.
385 Id. “XD” is a laughing emoticon. XD, SLANGIT, http://slangit.com/meaning/xd
[https://perma.cc/93S7-5HJG] (last updated Dec. 1, 2016).
386 Burge, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 1060.
387 Id.
388 Id.
389 Id. The district judge adopted the report and recommendation of a
magistrate judge, who recommended that summary judgment be granted to the
student on his First Amendment claim and that summary judgment be granted to the
school district on a due process claim. Id.
390 Id. at 1068–70.
377
378
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the involvement of law enforcement, or consider any mental
health evaluation or intervention.391 School officials also did not
remove the student from the teacher’s classroom.392 Rather, the
student simply was given a three-and-a-half day in-school
suspension, which he served by sitting in an office at school.393
Thus, the court determined that the conduct of school officials
showed a lack of any reasonable belief that the speech
constituted a credible threat.394
Given the serious issue of student threats of violence, it
truly is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not grant
certiorari in Bell. First, the Court could have articulated a clear
category of unprotected student off-campus speech. In addition,
the Court could have outlined the contours of that category.
Arguably the Fifth Circuit erred in concluding that Bell’s rap
song was a threat.395 The majority in Bell determined that
school personnel had been threatened even though, under the
measures outlined in Burge, no credible threat of violence had
been made. In Bell, school officials did not contact law
enforcement.396 On the first day that they discussed the rap
song with Bell, the school principal drove him home.397 On the
day that school officials suspended Bell, they allowed him to
remain unattended in the school commons for the rest of day so
that he could ride the bus home.398 In addition, the disciplinary
committee determined that any threat contained in the rap
song was “vague.”399 These important facts from the case
indicate that school officials did not interpret the rap song to be
a credible threat of violence.
Had the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bell, the
Court could have set constitutional guidelines for this
important category of student speech. In this regard, the
Court’s decision to deny certiorari in Bell was a missed
opportunity to clarify students’ First Amendment rights in the
digital age.
Id. at 1069.
Id.
393 Id. at 1064.
394 Id.; see also J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847,
858 (Pa. 2002) (listing relevant factors in determining whether a statement is a
credible threat, including how the recipient or other listeners reacted to the threat,
whether the threat was conditional, and whether the speaker had made similar
statements in the past).
395 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 429 (5th Cir. 2015) (Dennis,
J., dissenting).
396 Id.
397 Id.
398 Id.
399 Id. at 386.
391
392
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Tinker’s “Rights of Others” Prong Should Apply to
Student-on-Student Off-Campus Speech That
Constitutes Bullying or Harassment

The lower federal courts also need guidance as to the
proper scope of authority over student off-campus speech that
constitutes bullying or harassment. This is an issue that is of
particular importance in the digital age, since bullying using
electronic means, also known as cyberbullying, can be
particularly vicious and harmful.400 As to this form of student
off-campus electronic speech, many scholars have advocated
that the Supreme Court extend school authority under Tinker’s
“rights of others” prong.401 Indeed, bullying or harassing speech
seems to fit squarely within the rule expressed in Tinker that
one student’s speech should not interfere with the “rights of
other students to be secure and to be let alone.”402 Due to the
serious adverse consequences associated with student-onstudent bullying and harassment, no First Amendment
protection should be afforded to such speech, and school
officials ought to have the authority to discipline students for
such speech regardless of whether the speech was created
outside of the school environment. I therefore join other
scholars who advocate that Tinker’s rights of others prong be
applied to student-on-student bullying or harassing speech.
Tinker obviously was decided in an age where students
did not harass or bully each other electronically; however,
Tinker’s rationale, namely that all students have to the right to
be “let alone”403 at school, applies to off-campus bullying or
harassing speech because the effects of such speech are felt by
400 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 2011)
(detailing the harmful effects of student-on-student bullying). Due to a variety of
factors, particularly the distance between bully and victim that electronic
communications provide, cyberbullying can be particularly vicious and harmful. See
Kevin Turbert, Note, Faceless Bullies: Legislative and Judicial Responses to
Cyberbullying, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 651, 653–54 (2009) (detailing the harmful
effects of cyberbullying, particularly on adolescents); Gold Waldman, supra note 345, at
647–49 (detailing research on cyber speech).
401 See, e.g., Martha McCarthy, Student Expression That Collides with the
Rights of Others: Should the Second Prong of Tinker Stand Alone?, 240 EDUC. L. REP.
1, 10 (2009) [hereinafter McCarthy, Student Expression]; Martha McCarthy,
Cyberbullying Law and First Amendment Rulings: Can They Be Reconciled?, 83 MISS.
L.J. 805, 828 (2014) [hereinafter McCarthy, Cyberbullying]; Black, supra note 198, at
553; Crawford, supra note 340, at 262 (“The Supreme Court should validate the use of
the Tinker second prong analysis as an independent analytical tool to be used in
student off-campus cyberspeech cases involving bullying and harassment.”); Stacie A.
Stewart, Comment, A Trade-Off That Becomes a Rip-Off: When Schools Can’t Regulate
Cyberbullying, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1645, 1660 (2013).
402 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
403 Id.
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the victim at school and impact the victim’s educational rights.
Thus, at the next opportunity, the Court should hold that,
under Tinker’s rights of others prong, a student who engages in
speech that bullies or harasses another student in violation of
state anti-bullying legislation and school policies has no First
Amendment protection.404 Due to the impact on the victim
within the school environment, school officials are authorized
to impose discipline regardless of where such speech is created.
In this category of bullying or harassing speech, there is
another issue that the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Bell
brings to the forefront―whether student off-campus speech
that targets a school employee is entitled to First Amendment
protection. In Bell, the Fifth Circuit determined that school
officials could discipline a student whose off-campus speech
threatened, harassed, or intimidated a teacher if the student
intentionally directed the speech at the school community and
school officials could reasonably forecast a substantial
disruption.405 And yet the majority in Bell stated, albeit in
dicta, that a student’s off-campus speech that threatens,
harasses, and intimidates a teacher arguably might always
“portend[ ] a substantial disruption, making feasible a per se
rule in that regard.”406 The majority in Bell thus suggested that
off-campus student speech targeting a school official always is
unprotected because the forecast of a substantial disruption is
per se reasonable and thus assumed.
Thus, Bell reinvigorates a debate that had been
prompted in part by the Third Circuit’s decisions in Layshock
and Snyder—two cases in which the students had created fake
Internet profiles that ridiculed school administrators.407 In
Snyder, six judges dissented from the ruling in favor of the
404 For a review of state anti-bullying laws, see Nisha Chandran, Crossing the
Line: When Cyberbullying Prevention Operates as a Prior Restraint on Student Speech,
2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 277, 282–83 (2016) (noting that, as of the time of
publication, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia had enacted anti-bullying
legislation). In 2015, Montana became the last state in the nation to enact antibullying legislation. See Lisa Baumann, Gov. Bullock Signs Montana Anti-bullying
Bill into Law, GREAT FALLS TRIB. (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.greatfallstribune.com/
story/news/local/2015/04/21/gov-bullock-signs-montana-anti-bullying-bill-law/2614
5567/ [https://perma.cc/W8A7-72C5]. An important issue, which is beyond the scope of
this article, is how to define “bullying” or “harassment.” Some scholars assert that antibullying statutes contain vague language that unconstitutionally restricts students’
First Amendment rights. See, e.g., John O. Hayward, Anti-cyberbullying Statutes:
Threat to Student Free Speech, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85, 118 (2011).
405 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 396–400 (5th Cir. 2015)
(en banc).
406 Id. at 397.
407 See Layshock ex rel. Layschock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d
Cir. 2011) (en banc); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d
Cir. 2011).
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student primarily on the ground that the decision left “schools
defenseless to protect teachers and school officials”408 from
malicious cyberattacks by students. Indeed, many scholars
advocate that student off-campus speech that harasses a school
employee should not be entitled to First Amendment
protection.409 Still others argue that school authority should not
be extended to off-campus electronic speech that targets school
employees.410 These scholars reason that, unlike students, the
educational rights of school employees are not implicated by offcampus electronic speech that targets them.411 In addition, school
employees should be “equipped emotionally and intellectually” to
handle disrespectful or harassing speech published by a
student.412 School employees also have the ability to impose
discipline if such harassing speech is repeated at school. They
have the ability to pursue civil remedies against students whose
off-campus speech is defamatory or libelous.413
While student-on-student bullying or harassment
should not be protected speech for the reasons stated above,
student off-campus speech that arguably bullies or harasses a
school employee should not be subject to school discipline.414
Snyder, 650 F.3d at 941.
McCarthy, Cyberbullying, supra note 401, at 823 (suggesting that all
student electronic expression could be deemed to be in-school speech in order to allow
discipline for speech “directed towards school personnel or classmates”); Smith-Butler,
supra note 44, at 302 (“Speech described as bullying, harassing, libelous, or
threatening, if it is directed at other students or school personnel, is not protected
speech . . . .”); Stewart, supra note 401, at 1658 (“The decisions in Layshock and J.S.
are a rip-off to students and parents because the bullying of school staff affects the
ability of a school to provide a quality education.”).
410 Black, supra note 198, at 552–53 (disparagement of school personnel may
have low disruptive impact); Christine M. Lorillard, When Children’s Rights “Collide”:
Free Speech vs. The Right to Be Let Alone in the Context of Off-Campus “Cyberbullying”,
81 MISS. L.J. 189, 259 n.487 (2011) (distinguishing between student-on-student
harassment and student-on-school employee harassment); Barry P. McDonald,
Regulating Student Cyberspeech, 77 MO. L. REV. 727, 755 (2012).
411 Lorillard, supra note 410, at 259 n.287.
412 Id. (quoting Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1183 (9th
Cir. 2006)).
413 Teachers can recover against students for libelous speech. See Aditi
Mukherji, Teacher Gets $363K for Students’ Lies, Defamation, FINDLAW (Nov. 18,
2013), http://blogs.findlaw.com/injured/2013/11/teacher-gets-363k-for-students-liesdefamation.html [https://perma.cc/4BL5-YUNE].
414 Analytically it is not clear that Tinker’s “rights of others” prong does apply
to harassing or bullying speech that targets a school employee. The Court did refer to
speech that either “inva[des],” or “collid[es] with,” the rights of others without saying
specifically who the “others” might be. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). However, in at least one portion of the opinion, the Court
specifically referred only to the “rights of other students to be secure and to be let
alone.” Id. at 508. Thus, it is not clear the rights of others prong as expressed in Tinker
applies to school employees. See Philip T.K. Daniel, Bullying and Cyberbullying in
Schools: An Analysis of Student Free Expression, Zero Tolerance Policies, and State
Anti-harassment Legislation, 268 EDUC. L. REP. 619, 633 (2011).
408
409
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Students have a First Amendment right to “express disrespect
or disdain for their teachers,”415 including expressing their
views in vulgar terms if they wish.416 Extending school
authority to student off-campus speech that arguably bullies or
harasses a school employee could impermissibly chill student
speech. Students have the right to voice criticism of school
policies, procedures, and personnel. There is a real danger that
school officials might “engag[e] in illegitimate censorship of
speech critical of their own actions rather than imposing
discipline to protect legitimate institutional interests.”417 School
officials could overreach and violate a student’s constitutionally
protected right to express complaints about a teacher’s
competence, classroom demeanor, or other qualities simply to
assuage a coworker’s hurt feelings.418
The facts in Bell amply demonstrate this conundrum. If
the arguably threatening lyrics of Bell’s song are not
considered, the remainder of the song clearly ridiculed the
coaches’ behavior (“drool running down your mouth”),419 called
them names (“pervert,” “crazy,” and “lame”),420 and denigrated
a spouse’s appearance (“his wife ain’t got no ti[tt]ies”),421 among
other comments. Yet Bell also made a significant and
substantive complaint that the coaches were sexually
harassing female students (“looking down girls shirts,” “fucking
with the students,” “rubbing on the black girls ears in the
gym”).422 Although the majority in Bell deemed these
statements to be harassment and intimidation, one of the two
coaches testified before the federal district court that he
considered Bell’s speech to be “just a rap [song]” and that any
issue about the song would “probably just die down” if he did
not draw attention to it.423

415 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 425 (5th Cir. 2015) (Dennis,
J., dissenting).
416 Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441–42 (D. Me. 1986) (holding that the
school could not discipline a student for “giving the finger” to a teacher he encountered
in a restaurant parking lot, stating: “The First Amendment protection of freedom of
expression may not be made a casualty of the effort to force-feed good manners to the
ruffians among us”).
417 McDonald, supra note 410, at 728.
418 There is also the additional question of how to define harassing or bullying
speech in this context in such a way that students’ free speech rights are not chilled.
Only a handful of state anti-bullying statutes apply to school personnel. Gold
Waldman, supra note 345, at 635.
419 Bell, 799 F.3d at 384.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 Id.
423 Id. at 429 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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Was the song harassing and intimidating, as opposed to
merely being disrespectful? Does the issue turn on whether the
targeted school employee is upset? What about the fact that the
student sought to publicize inappropriate conduct by a school
employee? Given the possibility that students’ constitutionally
protected rights to question and criticize the conduct of school
officials could be improperly curtailed, the Court should not
endorse a per se rule that students may be disciplined for offcampus speech that harasses or bullies a school employee
based solely on content of the speech.424
Declining to extend authority over student off-campus
speech that harasses or bullies a school employee does not
leave school administrators without recourse. If the off-campus
speech enters the school environment in such a way that a
student either engages in lewd or indecent speech or causes a
substantial disruption, then school officials have clear
authority to impose discipline.425 Indeed, school officials
overwhelmingly prevail in cases that challenge the authority to
discipline students for vulgar or disrespectful on-campus
speech directed toward school employees.426 That disciplinary
authority would extend to any student who, although not the
original author of the speech, repeats the contents of the offcampus speech because the second student has engaged in
speech within the school environment.
In addition, any direct electronic communications
between a student and a school employee should be deemed to
be “in-school” speech. As Judge Smith correctly noted in his
concurring opinion in Snyder, a different analysis should apply
where a student “sen[ds] a disruptive email to school faculty from
his home computer.”427 Students increasingly communicate
electronically with school employees as part of their coursework.
Those direct student-to-school communications are not out-of424 Extending authority to allow discipline for off-campus electronic speech
that harasses or denigrates a teacher could encourage schools to engage in electronic
surveillance of students’ electronic communications. See, e.g., Emily F. Suski, Beyond
the Schoolhouse Gates: The Unprecedented Expansion of School Surveillance Authority
Under Cyberbullying Laws, 65 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 63 (2014).
425 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). Student on-campus speech
that upsets a “civil and respectful atmosphere toward teachers” constitutes a
substantial disruption. Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280
(W.D. Wash. 2007).
426 Gold Waldman, supra note 345, at 617 (noting that students generally lose
cases in which they challenged disciplinary action taken with respect to hostile or
disrespectful speech directed to school employees).
427 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d
Cir. 2011).

1594

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:4

school communications simply because the student is not
physically in school. Rather, the student is acting “qua
student”428 and any speech in that context would be subject to
discipline under the Supreme Court’s existing precedents.429
Specifically, electronic communications between a student and a
school employee is speech that, per Morse, is uttered in a “schoolsanctioned and school-supervised” setting.430 If the speech is lewd,
indecent, or offensive, it is subject to discipline under Fraser.431 If
it creates a substantial disruption—e.g., the student’s speech is
communicated to the entire class via email and causes a
distraction—then it is subject to discipline under Tinker.432
Finally, school officials and the targeted employee have
other tools at their disposal. Although the school may not be
able to discipline the student purely on the basis of off-campus
speech, school officials who become aware of such speech can
inform the student that his or her speech has been seen by
school officials and that the student will be subject to discipline
if the speech impacts the school environment.433 School officials
also can bring the student’s speech to the attention of the
student’s parents. Finally, if the particular school employee
finds the speech to be libelous or defamatory, the employee
could avail himself or herself of civil remedies.434

Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 389 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007).
430 Id.; see Susan S. Bendlin, Far from the Classroom, the Cafeteria, and the
Playing Field: Why Should the School’s Disciplinary Arm Reach Speech Made in a
Student’s Bedroom, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 195, 241 (2011) (“The Supreme Court has
already made it clear in Morse that when the activity was school-approved, attended by
students, and supervised by school administrators and teacher, a student’s speech
could be regulated there even though he was literally standing off campus and not
inside the schoolhouse gate.”).
431 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986).
432 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
433 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Hostile Educational Environments, 71 MD. L. REV.
705, 727 (2012). Indeed, school officials would have the opportunity to teach an
important lesson about our democracy. See Mary Sue Backus, OMG! Missing the
Teachable Moment and Undermining the Future of the First Amendment—TISNF!, 60
CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 153, 200 (2009).
434 See Alexander G. Tuneski, Online, Not Grounds: Protecting Student
Internet Speech, 89 VA. L. REV. 139, 142 (2003) (mentioning potential civil remedies);
Backus, supra note 433, at 187–88 (noting that a school employee successfully sued a
student and his parents for injuries resulting from the student’s off-campus
expression). School boards would not incur any liability in an action filed by an
employee who was the target of a student’s off-campus speech if the Court were clear
that such off-campus speech is protected under the First Amendment. Gold Waldman,
supra note 345, at 634.
428

429
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Tinker’s Substantial Disruption Standard Should Apply
to a Student’s Off-Campus Speech Only When an Actual
Disruption Has Occurred

To date, with the exception of the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Wynar, all of the circuit courts that have imposed
discipline for students’ off-campus electronic speech have
imposed a threshold test that must be satisfied before
analyzing the speech under Tinker. In the Second, Fourth, and
Eighth Circuits, the threshold inquiry is a “reasonable
foreseeability” test.435 The Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Bell
set forth an “intentional[] direct[ion]” threshold test that is
similar to the one proposed by Judge Smith in his concurring
opinion in Snyder.436 For the following reasons, none of these
threshold tests should be adopted by the Court.
Some scholars have expressed approval of the Second
Circuit’s “reasonable foreseeability” test as appropriately
balancing the First Amendment rights of students and the
authority of school officials to maintain a proper school
environment.437 These scholars believe that a “two-tiered”438
inquiry under which school officials must first determine the
reasonable foreseeability that a student’s speech would reach
school is a “more conservative approach”439 that provides
greater protection to students’ First Amendment rights,
essentially because there is a threshold inquiry before Tinker’s
substantial disruption standard is applied.440
However, Judge Smith noted in Snyder that such a
standard easily can be “stretched too far”441 and thus “risk[s]
ensnaring any off-campus expression that happened to discuss
school-related matters.”442 Most forms of digital speech,
435 Although the Kowalski decision has been interpreted by some as creating a
“nexus” test, the Fourth Circuit did not state that it was adopting a “nexus” test, nor
did it outline the elements or factors that comprise such a test. See supra Section II.C.
436 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d
Cir. 2011).
437 Black, supra note 198, at 551–52 (citing Paul Easton, Splitting the
Difference: Layshock and J.S. Chart a Different Path on Student Speech Rights, 53 B.C.
L. REV. E-SUPP. 17 (2012)).
438 Black, supra note 198, at 551.
439 Id.
440 Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2013).
441 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 940.
442 Id.; see also Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing
Principals, Teachers & Classmates in Cyberspace, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 251
(2009) (“[A]n approach like that adopted by the Second Circuit that relies solely on
whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the question in question will come to the
attention of school authorities gives schools sweeping off-campus jurisdictional
power.”).
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whether a public posting on the Internet443 or a private text
message sent to just one other person, can be preserved and
later shown to others. Thus, it is hard to conceptualize a form
of digital expression that could not be brought to the attention
of school officials. Indeed, it is surely true that the students in
Layshock and Snyder did not foresee that the disparaging
MySpace profiles they created would come to the attention of
their school principals. If just one student shares what was
intended to be a private communication, school officials will
become aware of the off-campus speech.444 Indeed, many forms
of electronic speech can proliferate far beyond the initial
transmission by the author through, for example, someone’s
“friends” on Facebook or Instagram or the ability to “like” a
particular post.445 Because almost all electronic speech could be
deemed as “reasonably foreseeable” to come to the attention of
school officials, the reasonable foreseeability standard seems to
provide very little protection to students.446
In addition, the type of student off-campus electronic
speech that most likely would come to the attention of school
authorities would be speech relating to school events or
individuals. By providing such a low threshold for the
imposition of school discipline, the reasonable foreseeability
test unduly constricts students’ ability to engage in free speech
about an important and predominant aspect of their lives:
school.447 Students would have very limited First Amendment
rights if, in speaking about school matters while not at school,
they must restrict the audience to such an extent that it would
be unreasonable for their speech to come to the attention of
school authorities.
The intentional direction language used by the Fifth
Circuit in Bell might, at first glance, appear to set a higher
threshold because it would require that the student had
A Facebook post, for example.
Snyder, 650 F.3d at 921 (A student who was in the principal’s office due to
an “unrelated incident” told the principal about the parody profile.).
445 See Web Applications: How to Hide My Likes from My Friends on
Facebook?, STACKEXCHANGE, http://webapps.stackexchange.com/questions/24391/howto-hide-my-likes-from-my-friends-on-facebook [https://perma.cc/B4HU-5G3L].
446 See Bendlin, supra note 430, at 221–22 (“[U]nder the foreseeability
test . . . it is hard to know in advance how or when an Internet message might be
printed out or brought on to the campus (in some form) by someone other than the
student-speaker. The problem with vague standards is that neither school officials nor
students know exactly what the rules are.” (footnote omitted)).
447 Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus
Punishment, 85 IND. L.J. 1113, 1128 (2010) (“The Second Circuit’s broad construction of
the ‘reasonable foreseeability’ test thus suggests that schools may possess jurisdiction
over virtually all student Internet speech that relates to school issues and tries to
galvanize student action.”).
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444

2017]

A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

1597

directed speech into the school environment.448 However, it
suffers from essentially the same defects as the reasonable
foreseeability test. Again, the threshold for imposition of
authority is quite low if a student’s intentional direction is
determined by the extent to which the student spoke on a
matter of interest to the school community and intended that
other students would consider the speech.449 As with the
reasonable foreseeability test, it seems that students would
essentially have no protection if they sought to speak about a
matter in any way related to school and if they wanted their
speech to reach others.450 In addition, the intentional direction
test has the added difficulty of asking school officials to determine
the subjective intent of a student before imposing discipline.451
The better rule is to not have any threshold tests. With
the exception of speech constituting threats of violence or
student-on-student bullying, as discussed above,452 school
officials should be given the authority to impose discipline only
when the student’s purely off-campus speech actually causes a
substantial disruption at school. In other words, student
speech, no matter where it is created, that causes an actual
substantial disruption within the school environment should be
subject to discipline.453 If a student’s speech actually disrupts
the school environment, the student should not be shielded
from discipline by the excuse that the speech was created off
campus. Given the prevalence of electronic communications
and easy access to such communications even in the school
environment, the off-campus electronic nature of the
communications should not be relevant to the inquiry. The
issue should be solely whether the student’s speech caused a
substantial disruption in the school environment. Thus, Tinker
should apply even without the necessity of some threshold test.
448 See, e.g., David A. Polsinelli, Comment, Untangling the Web: A More
Guided Approach to Student Speech on the Internet, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 779, 807–08
(2013); Lindsay J. Gower, Blue Mountain School District v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder: Will the
Supreme Court Provide Clarification for Public School Officials Regarding Off-Campus
Internet Speech?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 709, 730 (2013) (arguing in favor of a “purposeful
direction” standard as superior to a foreseeability test).
449 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 386, 394 (5th Cir. 2015) (en
banc) (finding that Bell intentionally directed his rap song at the school community,
presumably because of his apparent admissions that he wanted to bring awareness to
the coaches’ conduct and he knew students would listen to the song).
450 Id. at 418 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (deeming the majority’s intentional
direction inquiry to be incurably ambiguous).
451 Benjamin L. Ellison, More Connection, Less Protection? Off-Campus Speech
with On-Campus Impact, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 809, 836 (2010) (“Subjective intent
can be difficult to determine.”).
452 See supra Sections III.A, III.B.
453 Bendlin, supra note 430, at 222.
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There is an important limitation to the application of
Tinker, namely that school officials ought not be allowed to
discipline a student for purely off-campus electronic speech
based on a reasonable forecast of a substantial disruption. As
discussed in more detail below,454 because of the potential to
chill students’ ability to engage in free speech when not at
school, school officials’ authority to impose discipline for purely
off-campus speech should extend only to student speech that
caused an actual disruption at school, not just a reasonable
forecast about future potential disruptions. The off-campus
nature of the speech, coupled with the prognosticating of school
officials about future events, has constitutional implications—
primarily that school officials would impermissibly chill student
speech by overemphasizing the potential for a future disruption.
However, expressly applying Tinker to student offcampus electronic speech is not the end of the inquiry. If the
Court applied Tinker to student off-campus speech, then the
Court would need to define the word “substantial.” In that
regard, it is relevant that, even with evidence in Tinker that a
mathematics class had been “practically ‘wrecked’ chiefly by
disputes,”455 the Court found no substantial disruption.456 A
substantial disruption should be something much more than
“general ‘rumblings’”457 among students, “minor inconveniences”
to school personnel, or limited distractions from classwork.458
Rather, a substantial disruption would require, as noted in
Bell, “boisterous conduct, interruption of classes, or [a] lack of
order, discipline and decorum at the school.”459
In addition to defining when a disruption is substantial,
the Court also would have to address the issue of causation. In
See infra Section III.D.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting).
456 Id. at 508 (majority opinion) (“There is no indication that the work of the
schools or any class was disrupted. Outside the classrooms, a few students made
hostile remarks to the children wearing armbands, but there were no threats or acts of
violence on school premises.”).
457 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 922 (3d
Cir. 2011).
458 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 299 (3d
Cir. 2010).
459 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 296 (5th Cir. 2015). School
officials sometimes are wildly off-base in their own judgment that a substantial
disruption has occurred at school. See, e.g., T.V. ex. rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch.
Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (The court ruled that a school district
had violated the First Amendment rights of two high school students who posted
provocative photos of themselves over the summer vacation, finding that “two
complaints from parents and some petty sniping among a group of 15 and 16 year
olds. . . . can’t be what the Supreme Court had in mind when it enunciated the
‘substantial disruption’ standard in Tinker.”).
454
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his concurring opinion in Snyder, Judge Smith indirectly raised
this issue by describing a scenario in which a student, outside
of school hours, posted a blog supporting gay marriage, to
which other students had a negative reaction.460 He
hypothesized that classmates who opposed gay marriage might,
in reacting to the speech, “cause[ ] a substantial disruption at
school.”461 Judge Smith determined that, if Tinker were to apply
to off-campus electronic speech, the student who posted the
blog entry could be subject to discipline.462
In Judge Smith’s hypothetical, the student who posts
the blog should not be subject to discipline simply because there
is a lack of causation. Except in very limited circumstances,463
speech that provokes a reaction in others who might show their
disagreement by causing a disruption does not make the speaker
responsible for the audience’s actions. In the hypothetical posed
by Judge Smith, the student in favor of gay marriage would not
have caused a disruption. Rather, the students who would have
voiced their opposition at school would be the cause of any
substantial disruption.464
Such a rule might be difficult to follow sometimes.
Students might engage in off-campus speech, such as racist
comments, that could provoke strong reactions.465 However, in
our democracy, even speech that many citizens would find
“shabby, offensive, or even ugly” is entitled to First Amendment
protection.466 One of the burdens that we citizens face as a
“trade-off” for our own free speech rights is to recognize the
constitutional rights of other citizens to voice opinions that we
might abhor. When faced with such speech, students could learn
a valuable civics lesson about the fundamental values of our
democracy and the ways in which others have responded to

Snyder, 650 F.3d at 939.
Id.
462 Id.
463 While the Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572–74 (1942) established that “fighting words” are not protected under the First
Amendment because of their effect on listeners, the Court’s recent decision in Snyder
greatly limits the applicability of that doctrine. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459–
61 (2011).
464 Imposing discipline upon a student who expresses a particular view
outside of school based on the reactions of other students to the speech would
constitute an unconstitutional application of the “heckler’s veto.” See Daniel Ortner,
The Terrorist’s Veto: Why the First Amendment Must Protect Provocative Portrayals of
the Prophet Muhammad, 12 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 27 (2016).
465 S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 773 (8th
Cir. 2012).
466 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 426 (5th Cir. 2015) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000)).
460
461
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hateful or disturbing language or conduct.467 Such a result
would be a valuable addition to our students’ education.
D.

As to a Forecast of a Substantial Disruption, School
Officials Should Not Be Able to Discipline Students for
Their Off-Campus Speech

Finally, the Court also should determine that, as to offcampus speech, school officials may not impose discipline based
on nothing more than a reasonable forecast of a future
substantial disruption.468 Again, this rule would be applicable
only if the Court also determined that student off-campus
electronic speech is not protected when (a) the speech is a
credible threat of violence against any member of the school
community469 or (b) it bullies or harasses another student.470
With those two rules in place, student off-campus speech
generally should not be subject to discipline based on a
potential future disruption.471
School authority over off-campus speech should be
limited to discipline for actual, not forecasted disruptions, because
of the risk that school officials will overzealously predict
disruptions. In his dissent in Bell, Judge Dennis aptly described
the difficulty of forecasting future disruptions, stating:
If this standard were applied off campus, how can a student or a
student’s parents know with any degree of certainty when off-campus
online speech can be “forecasted” to cause a “substantial disruption”?
Although Tinker is not a completely toothless standard, . . . its
framework inherently requires guesswork about how a third-party
school official will prophesize over the effect of speech.472

Judge Dennis is right. Students’ constitutional right to
speak freely when they are not at school should not be subject
to second-guessing by a school official about the potential
future impact on the school environment. Rather, other than
Backus, supra note 433, at 200.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
469 See supra Section III.A.
470 See supra Section III.B.
471 Denying school officials the authority to discipline students for off-campus
electronic speech on the basis of a potential future disruption is not the same
constitutional analysis as allowing school officials the authority to prohibit students from
wearing clothing that displays or represents a point of view (e.g., the Confederate flag) in
order to avoid future disruptions. See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d
764 (9th Cir. 2014) (determining that school officials could prohibit students from wearing
clothing bearing the symbol of the American flag on Cinco de Mayo).
472 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 386, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2015)
(en banc) (quoting A.M. ex rel. McAllum v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2009)).
467

468
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violent or student-on-student bullying speech, school officials
simply should not be able to impose discipline for off-campus
speech without concrete evidence that the speech actually
impacted the school environment. Constitutional rights should
not depend on the extent to which a particular school official
undertakes a crystal ball inquiry about the potential future
effect of a student’s off-campus speech.473 Indeed, the vagueness
of the standard would allow school officials to conjure up
reasons why student off-campus speech that they find
distasteful, perhaps because they do not like the language474 or
images used,475 could cause some future disruption at school.
CONCLUSION
Both the lower federal courts and school officials need
Supreme Court guidance on all of the important First
Amendment considerations that are implicated by students’ offcampus electronic speech. By denying certiorari in Bell, the
Court missed an outstanding opportunity to provide that
necessary guidance.
Given the facts in Bell, the Court could have provided
guidance regarding speech that threatens violence in the school
setting or harasses or bullies other students. If the Court
indeed addresses the issue in the near future, the Court should
provide clear guidance with regard to student electronic speech
that contains credible threats of violence or constitutes studenton-student bullying. These particular forms of speech present
special dangers in the school environment that require particular
vigilance and swift action on the part of school officials.476
The Court also could have clarified important aspects of
Tinker’s substantial disruption standard, beginning with an
affirmation that Tinker’s principles apply as equally well in the
digital age as they did when first articulated in 1969. When
given the opportunity, the Court should find that Tinker’s
473 For a review of cases that address the reasonableness of a forecast of
future substantial disruption caused by students’ off-campus electronic speech, see
Samantha M. Levin, School Districts as Weathermen: The School’s Ability to
Reasonably Forecast Substantial Disruption to the School Environment from Students’
Online Speech, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 859, 870–889 (2011).
474 See Bell, 799 F.3d at 429 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (noting that, in the
preliminary injunction hearing, the school board’s lawyer characterized Bell’s rap song
as “filthy”).
475 T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784
(N.D. Ind. 2011) (school district could not reasonably foresee a future disruption arising
from sexually suggestive photos that had been posted by two high school students over
summer vacation).
476 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007).
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substantial disruption standard applies to student off-campus
speech so long as the speech creates an actual disruption at
school. However, the Court should also recognize the potential
for improper overreach by school officials with regard to
students’ off-campus electronic speech and thus limit officials’
authority to speech that causes an actual disruption at school.
In other words, school officials should not be permitted to
impose discipline based on their opinion that, having read a
student’s electronic speech, some future disruption might occur
at school.
While the decision not to grant certiorari in Bell
represents a missed opportunity to clarify students’ First
Amendment rights in the digital age, the lower federal courts
and school officials alike can hope that, in the near future, the
Court will provide the needed guidance.

